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INSURANCE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION RE-EXAMINED*
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WILEYt

I.
INTRODUCTION.

S THE INSURANCE BUSINESS subject to the federal antitrust
laws? If so, to what extent? If not, should it be?
These questions have once again been brought sharply to the fore
as a result of a series of federal court decisions during the last two
years. Most recently, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, on the merits, held the so-called "mutual rule,"
under which the members of a local independent insurance agents
board refused to deal in mutual insurance, to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.'
About a year ago the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied motions to quash subpoenas duces
tecum issued by a grand jury investigating possible antitrust violations in the aviation insurance industry.2 The court based its decision on the ground that the federal antitrust laws were not completely
inapplicable to the insurance industry, following the Supreme Court
decision of less than a month before in F.T.C. v. Travelers Health
Ass'n, 8 in which the Court had held that a Nebraska statute pro* This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Laws at Harvard University.
t A.B., Bowdoin College, 1948; B.C.L., Oxford University, 1951; LL.M.,
Harvard University, 1959. Member of the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Bingham,
Dana & Gould, Boston; Lecturer on Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
2. In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Aviation Ins. Ind., 183 F. Supp. 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
3. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
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hibiting unfair or deceptive practices in the insurance business either
in Nebraska or "in any other state" did not afford a Nebraska mailorder insurance company exemption from the regulatory jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission over deceptive advertising practices.
Finally, late in 1959, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, in denying a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, held the Sherman Act to be applicable to price fixing
conspiracies among insurance companies effectuated by boycott, coercion and intimidation.4
Underlying this series of recent cases, followed or distinguished in
most of them, and the natural starting point for a consideration of
the questions raised above is the per curiam opinion of the Supreme
Court almost three years ago in National Cas. Co. v. F.T.C. and
American Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. F.T.C.5 Each case involved the
mailing across state lines of allegedly misleading accident and health
insurance advertising literature. The facts of the two cases, which
had been consolidated for purposes of appeal, may be simply stated.
The National Casualty Company, domiciled in Detroit, was licensed
to conduct an insurance business in every state, the District of
Columbia and Hawaii. Most of its business was solicited through
independent commission agents in the various states; the advertising material in question was prepared at the home office of the
company and shipped in bulk to agents who distributed it locally and
assumed the distribution expense; less than five per cent of the
solicitations were conducted by direct mail advertising from the home
office; more than eighty per cent of the policies issued by the home office
were issued on the basis of an application taken by an agent in
the state of residence of the insured; only five per cent of the premiums received by the company were sent to the home office directly by mail from the policyholders; and the company did not
advertise through radio, television or other media of mass communication. The facts were substantially the same for the business
of the American Hospital and Life Insurance Company, except that
this latter company was licensed to write accident and health insurance in only fourteen states, including its domiciliary state of Texas.
As a result of complaints, the F.T.C. issued cease and desist orders
charging that the companies' advertising was false, misleading and
deceptive in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
4. California League of Independent
179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959). For
781 (1960). A motion to dismiss had
version of the complaint. 175 F. Supp.
5. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
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Act.' In each of these orders the F.T.C. specifically found that it
had jurisdiction over the practices involved.7 Appeals were taken
by the companies to the Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits on the jurisdictional issue, and in each instance the
F.T.C. was reversed. 8 The ground for reversal in each case was
that jurisdiction had been taken from the F.T.C. by the provisions of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 under which the business of
insurance had been subjected to regulation by the states and in
which Congress had declared that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, all as amended, should apply
to the business of insurance only to the extent that that business had
not been regulated by state law.'
The Supreme Court affirmed on the jurisdictional issue. The three
principal arguments advanced by the F.T.C. were discussed by the
Court, however, in terms which raised more questions than they answered. First, the Court determined, at least for the "instant cases,"
that nothing in the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
warranted the F.T.C. contention that the state "regulation" required to
oust Commission jurisdiction must consist of definite state administrative standards and actions, and not mere statutory prohibition,
with regard to the particular insurance practice concerned.'" Second,
the Court expressly found that most of the states in which the companies were distributing their advertising literature in fact had their
own statutes forbidding unfair and deceptive practices and apparently.
further found that the mere existence of those statutes was sufficient to
keep the Federal Trade Commission Act from applying." Third, the
Court carefully left open the question of the "intent of Congress with
regard to interstate insurance practices which the States cannot for
constitutional reasons regulate effectively . . . ." On this branch of the
case the Court simply stated that the question did not now arise because the particular advertising program there involved required the
use of company agents to distribute the material locally and because
the states had "ample means" to regulate this advertising within their
own boundaries. 2
6. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
7. National Cas. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1385 (May 21, 1956); American Hosp. & Life
Ins. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1100 (April 24, 1956).
8. National Cas. Co. v. F.T.C., 245 F. 2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957); American
Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 243 F. 2d 719 (Sth Cir. 1957).
9. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1958).

10. 357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958).

11. Id. at 562-63.
12. Id. at 563-64. On this point the F.T.C. had argued to the Court that rejection of F.T.C. jurisdiction would create a "no man's land" which Congress could
not have intended. Brief for the Petitioner, p. 41. Both Circuit Courts of Appeal
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National Casualty and American Hospital & Life have attracted

surprisingly little critical commentary although the cases represent the
first direct consideration by the Court of the particular problems involved. 3 The three legal issues before the Court in those cases are,
nevertheless, of major significance far beyond the field of accident and
health insurance advertising, which is just one narrow phase of the
problem of governmental regulation of the insurance business. Indeed,
those three issues are vital in determining the applicability in general
of the federal antitrust laws to that business, a determination not yet
squarely presented to the Supreme Court but currently made increasingly important because of the recent rise in the number of insurance antitrust cases and the comprehensive investigation into insurance antitrust practices now being conducted by the Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 4
also recognized that an "irreducible area" of F.T.C. jurisdiction probably existed

but that it simply was not presented in the record of these two cases. 245 F.2d
883, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1957); 243 F.2d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 1957). The extent of
this area was later substantially defined in F.T.C. v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362
U.S. 293 (1960).
13. They were not mentioned in the Harvard Law Review's annual survey of
the Supreme Court's work, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. Rev.
77 (1958). But see Note, 57 MIcH. L. lRv. 289 (1958) where the third problem,
extraterritorial application of the state unfair trade practice laws, is discussed. See
also Note, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 156 (1959).
14. This investigation was authorized by S. lRs. 231, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), 104 CoNe,. R~c. 1503 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1958). It was designed to inquire
into arbitrary and uniform insurance rates and restrictive measures impeding the
entry of new insurance companies which seek to charge lower rates. S. Rep. No.
1200, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958). In this sense the current investigation follows
in the tradition of the several earlier extensive inquiries into insurance. These
principal earlier investigations, which will be discussed in the course of this paper,
were the Armstrong Investigation of life insurance in New York (1905), the
Merritt Investigation of fire insurance in New York (1911), the Lockwood Investigation of housing conditions, which also considered fire insurance rate making,
in New York (1922), and the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC)
Investigation into the concentration of economic power conducted by a special federal
committee in 1938-1940. The insurance phase of this last investigation considered
only the life insurance business but, significantly, included both the insurance and
investment phases of that branch of insurance.
However, the current Senate investigation is intended to go beyond these
earlier inquiries in the sense that it proposes to review the entire status of insurance
regulation by the states and will attempt to determine whether any revision should
be made by Congress of the substantially complete exemption from the federal
antitrust laws now afforded insurance by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 104 CONG.
R c. 1491 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1958) (statement by Senator Kefauver). Indeed, the
scope of the investigation will be extremely comprehensive. It is apparently felt
that the fact that in 1957 some 8% of the national income went into $26 billion of life,
casualty and property insurance premiums justifies a very detailed inquiry into
the industry. With regard to property insurance, the investigators propose to consider the following topics: (1) how rates are established; (2) uniformity in policy
forms; (3) standards applied by states in approval of rates; (4) reasons for
exclusion of investment income in fire insurance rate making; (5) whether deviations
from "bureau" rates are readily granted; (6) whether companies are free to adopt
new merchandising methods which will bring insurance to the public at lower cost;
(7) restrictions on entry and licensing of new firms; (8) discriminatory state
capital and surplus requirements against out-of-state insurers; (9) mergers and
acquisitions; (10) enforcement of state unfair trade practice acts; and (11) control
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It is the purpose of this paper to examine in this broader context the implications of the Court's treatment of only the first two
of the three issues recently placed before it. The third issue, the
problem of the extraterritorial reach of state law, would in itself require a separate paper. I have no intention of attempting to rationalize
all of the antitrust cases involving the insurance industry and to restate
the law in that field. My purpose, rather, is to explore two specific
problems. First, under the existing McCarran-Ferguson Act language,
what degree of state regulation is required to exclude application of
the federal antitrust laws? Second, to what extent have the states
actually achieved the requisite degree of regulation? Under this
second heading an attempt will be made to determine the actual state
of the law with regard to two selected insurance transactions or practices in which antitrust problems might arise, to appraise the effectiveness of the present legal treatment of those practices, whether by
application of state prohibitory laws or by direct state regulation,
and to make suggestions as to the course the law should take in the
future with regard to those practices.
These two problems are inherent in any attempt to apply the
federal antitrust laws to the business of insurance. Unless and until
Congress elects to change the present provisions of the McCarranFerguson Act, these problems cannot honestly be avoided, either by
parties or courts, in any insurance antitrust litigation.

Nor can

they be avoided by Congress, state insurance commissioners or the
by states over switching assets from one state to another under the "zone" examination system. With regard to life insurance, the investigators will focus on the
problem of size and economic power and the potential for good or evil in development
of the economy resulting from increasing concentration of savings in life insurance
companies. The Senate Subcommittee also proposes to review the question considered earlier by the TNEC, i.e., whether maximum insurance benefits at the lowest
cost consistent with. financial stability are being provided by life insurance companies. Address entitled The Congress Looks at Insurance, by Donald P. McHugh,
Counsel of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, American Management Ass'n, New York City, May 6, 1958. Subcommittee Press Release, May 6,
1958. See also N.Y. Times, May 7, 1958, p. 58, col. 1 (city ed.).
The Subcommittee investigation was under the overall supervision of former
Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Democrat of Wyoming, who was a member of the
TNEC and who played a leading role in events leading up to passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945. Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee,
has headed the general study of the effectiveness of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In
August 1958 the Subcommittee began with five days of hearings on aviation casualty
insurance and air travel insurance. Other hearings were held in May, June and
August 1959 on ocean marine insurance and state fire and casualty rating laws and
in May 1960 on non-admitted alien insurers and surplus line insurers. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 pts. (1959-60). As yet the only report issued
has been one covering aviation and ocean marine insurance. S. RXp. No. 1834,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). A summary review of the investigation thus far appears in Knowlton, Present Status of the Investigation of the Business of and the
Regulation of Insurance by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the United States Senate, 1960 INs. L.J. 641.
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industry in considering the necessity for any revision

of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and its present partial exemption
of the insurance business from the federal antitrust laws.
II.
BACKGROUND

For tyros in insurance a few preliminary words about the development of the industry's present unique status under the federal
antitrust laws may be helpful before delving into detailed consideration
of the two problems selected.
The history of the unusual relationship between the federal government, the states and the business of insurance is largely the story
of fire insurance in the United States. Early insurance regulation in
the middle of the nineteenth century was undertaken by the states
rather than by the federal government.') While the more sophisticated
Eastern states, in which most of the large companies of the day were
domiciled, attempted to develop affirmative supervision of insurance
through establishment of sound underwriting practices, the newer
Western states were pursuing a different course. These states sought
to favor their own small domestic companies against the Eastern
"agency" companies by enacting laws requiring large deposits from
the so-called "foreign," i.e., out-of-state, insurers and by imposing
heavy taxes on their local operations. 1"
After the Civil War these state impositions, coupled with disastrous losses suffered in several major city conflagrations, forced
Eastern fire insurance companies to seek relief from Congress. The
15. Insurance, which began in the United States in the late 18th Century, was
not subject to statutory supervision marked by effective regulation until the 1830s.
Prior to that time regulation consisted generally of simple charter limitations on
capital imposed by the states. The first continuing administrative supervision of
insurance began with appointment of an insurance commissioner by New Hampshire
in 1851. Massachusetts soon followed in 1858 with an insurance department headed by
the famous Elizur Wright, who has been called the "father of life insurance."
By 1890 some seventeen states had administrative supervision of insurance. Threefourths of the states in 1919 had a single full-time official heading their insurance
departments. At the present time every state has a regulatory agency for insurance.
The supervisory officials have been organized since 1871 in a cooperative body now
known as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as NAIC), whose efforts are directed toward improving state regulation
of insurance. 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 40 (5th ed. 1952). The functions of the
NAIC are described in Martin, The NAIC and State Insurance Department Functions, 1952 INS. L.J. 583.
16. For example, Wisconsin required every foreign insurer to take $25,000 worth
of her state bonds. 1876-77 INSURANcE BLUs BOOK, Fire Insurance, 1860-1869, 29-34
(Centennial Issue 1877). For an early state case upholding a 3% premium tax
against the argument that it would interfere with interstate commerce, see People v.
Thurber, 13 Ill. 554 (1852). A good description of the various burdens imposed
by Western states appears in Nehemkis, Paul v. Virginia: The Need for ReExamination, 27 Gio. L.J. 519, 523-25 (1939).
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newly organized National Board of Fire Underwriters unsuccessfully
sought the creation of an Insurance Bureau and an Insurance Commissioner as part of the Treasury Department at Washington to whom
all deposits and fees were to be paid.17 Frustrated before Congress,
the National Board turned to the courts. In May, 1866, one Samuel
B. Paul was appointed agent in Virginia by several New York fire
insurance companies. His principals refused to comply with the local
statutory requirement of a deposit of bonds prerequisite to doing
business. Nevertheless, Paul sold a single policy, was indicted for
violation of the statute and was convicted. There can be little question that this was a "put-up'' case in which the fire insurance companies hoped that the Supreme Court would rule that insurance
was interstate commerce and thus outside the reach of burdensome
state statutes.' 8
But the companies once again met disappointment, for the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction in the famous, and extremely troublesome, decision, Paul v. Virginia.9 In the course of his opinion Mr.
Justice Field made two categorical statements which were to plague
the Court and to influence the development of constitutional law
for the next seventy-five years: first, the issuance of a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce; second, insurance policies
are not commodities or articles of commerce which have any existence
independent of the parties to them.2 ° The real impact of Paul v.
Virginia, however, was not made felt through applications of these
two narrower versions of its meaning. Despite the fact that nothing
17. The National Board of Fire Underwriters was formed in 1866 as a "trade
association" for joint action after the fire insurance companies had in November,
1865, appointed a committee to draft a suitable proposal for presentation to Congress. INSURANcE BLuE BOOK, op. cit. supra note 16 at 32. A copy of the Memorial to
Congress by the National Board of Fire Underwriters appears in 13 INS. MONITOR
AND WALL ST. Rgv. 191 (1865). The Insurance Monitor is one of many early insurance trade periodicals, most of which have long since been discontinued. A good
bibliography of these, and also of the modern insurance trade literature, will be
found in 2 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION (1906-1952) 1133 (1953). The
bill based on the National Board proposal, H.R. 738, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866),
was reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee but was laid on the
table without any further action. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3490 (1866).
Editorial opinion in the insurance trade press of the day indicates that the industry
saw in this bill an escape from harrassment by the states. 14 INS. MONITOR AND
WALL ST. REv. 53 (1866); 2 INS. TIMEs 179 (1869). The unsuccessful 1866 bill
was only the first of many subsequent attempts by the insurance industry, even as
late as 1933, to secure federal supervision of the business. These later proposals are
summarized in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U,S. 533, 592 n.13 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
18. The National Board of Fire Underwriters cooperated in the appeal and
paid $15,000 toward counsel fees and costs. PROCEEDINGS, 3D ANN. MEETING, NATIONAL
BOARD or FIRE UNDERWRITERS 40-42 (1869).
The events surrounding the case are
described in detail in Nehemkis, supra note 16, at 525-26.
19. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
20. Id. at 182-85.
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in the original case itself justified such an extension, in many later
cases the Court relied upon it to. find that the entire "business of
insurance," as distinguished from the mere insurance policy or its
issuance, was not in interstate commerce. Under this reading of
the case marine insurance and life insurance were swept indiscriminately from under the reach of federal power. 2 It is, therefore, no
surprise that the one federal court case which prior to 1943 considered the applicability of the federal antitrust laws to insurance
flatly dismissed a private antitrust action on the authority of Paul
v. Virginia and its satellite cases and did not even consider its decision
worth reporting officially.22
The first direct federal action against the insurance business came
on November 20, 1942, with the indictment by a grand jury at Atlanta
of 198 fire insurance companies and 27 individuals under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.23 The companies were charged with
conspiring through the South-Eastern Underwriters Association, a
21. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 653 (1895) (upholding a state bonding
requirement imposed on a foreign marine insurer); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900) (upholding a state statute modifying normal life
insurance policy terms). It is also significant that reliance upon Paul v. Virginia
in an early Canadian case has continued to this day in that country substantially
the same division between the roles of central and local governments in insurance
regulation as exists in the United States. In Parsons v. Citizens Ins. Co., [1879]
3 Can. Sup. Ct. 215, two justices of the Canadian Supreme Court expressly relied
on Paul v. Virginia in holding valid an Ontario provincial statute requiring certain
conditions to be included in a fire insurance policy despite the provisions of the
British North America Act of 1867, which reserved to the Dominion government
exclusive power over "trade and commerce." See opinions of Fournier, J., at 277,
and Henry, J., at 288. This case was subsequently affirmed or. another ground,
without decision on the question of insurance as "trade or commerce," by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Citizens Ins. Co. of Canada v. Parsons, [1881]
A.C. 96 (P.C. Ont.). On the problem of insurance as "trade or commerce" in
Canada, see also Angers pro Regina v. Queen Ins. Co., 21 L.C.J. 307 (Q.B. 1877),
aff'd per curiam, [1878] 3 A.C. 1090 (P.C. Que.). For a discussion of the impact
of these cases on the Canadian scheme of insurance regulation see MacDonald,
The Regulation of Insurance in Canada, 24 CAN. B. Rev. 257, 265 (1946) ; Gray, More
on the Regulation of Insurance, 24 CAN. B. Rv. 481 (1946).
22. Lown v. Underwriters Ass'n, 6 Fed. Anti-Trust Dec. 1048 (D.C. Sup.
Ct. 1915) (plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant association and certain fire
insurance companies from fixing premium rates).

23. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958). The decision of
the Department of Justice to prosecute South-Eastern Underwriters Association

apparently resulted from an appeal by Attorney General Roy McKittrick of Missouri
after that state had struggled for some 20 years to handle the problem of ratefixing combinations by fire insurance companies under its own state laws. See Joint
Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362,
H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3, at 23-78 (1943) (hereinafter cited as 1943 Hearings). Missouri's battles with the fire insurance companies
make an amazing story which began with an order by that state's insurance super-

intendent in 1922 reducing fire insurance rates as he was authorized to do under
Missouri's then new rating law, Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 6283 (1919). The legal struggle
continued through dozens of court cases in both state and federal courts during the
next 20 years and ultimately involved bribery of the insurance superintendent by

"Boss" Pendergast and substantial losses to policyholders in the companies affected. For a brief synopsis of the history of this litigation see Note, 41 ILL. L. Rv.

647, 654 (1947).
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regional rating bureau, to fix premium rates on fire insurance and
allied lines and with using boycotts to force other insurance companies into the conspiracy and to compel persons to purchase insurance only from Association members, all in restraint of trade in
six Southeastern states. The district judge sustained a demurrer
dismissing the indictment, relying on Paul v. Virginia and the accumulated precedent of seventy-five years that insurance was not
commerce and was, therefore, outside the antitrust laws. 24
Shortly after the district judge had rendered his decision, and
even prior to the Supreme Court's noting probable jurisdiction in
the case," a series of three bills proposing a complete and blanket
exemption of the insurance business from the federal antitrust laws
was introduced into Congress on behalf of the fire insurance companies.26 Joint Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary of
both houses of Congress held eleven days of hearings, scattered over
a period of nine months, on these bills.27 However, before the hearings

were completed, the Supreme Court on June 5, 1944, handed down its
decision in the South-Eastern Underwriters case holding that the
24. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712
(N.D. Ga. 1943). The district court opinion was issued on August 5, 1943.
25. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 10, 1943. See
320 U.S. 776 (1943).
26. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) was introduced by Mr. Walter
on Sept. 20, 1943. 89 CONG. Rxc. 7686 (1943). The text of this bill, which was
quite simple, appears as follows at 90 CoNc. REc. 6549 (1944): "That nothing
contained in the act of July 2, 1890, known as the Sherman Act, or the act of
October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, shall be construed to
apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct of that business or
in anywise to impair the regulation of that business by the several States." Other
bills to the same effect were H.R. 3269, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) introduced by
Mr. Hancock also on Sept. 20, 1943, 89 CONG. 1gc. 7686 (1943), and S. 1362, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) introduced by Senators Bailey and Van Nuys on Sept. 21,
1943, 89 CoNG. Rxc: 7689 (1943). These complete exemption bills were the proposals of the fire insurance industry. 2 BULtY, THg AMERICAN Lips CONVENTION
(1906-1952) 940 (1953). It appears that the life insurance business took no active
part in promoting these bills. Statement of Mr. Leroy Lincoln, President of the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appearing at 1944 AMERICAN Ln CONVZNTION PROCPZ-INGs 75.

For a description of the pressures exerted on Congressmen

by the fire insurance companies, see 89 CONG. Rc. 10144-145 (1943) ; 89 CoNG. RIc.
A 5272 (1943). Material prepared by the National Board of Fire Underwriters
raised the spectre of federal control of the insurance business unless the complete
exemption bills were passed. See National Board Pamphlet, Recent Attempts to
Apply the Federal Anti-trust Laws to the Fire Insurance Business Focus Attention
on a Matter of Vital Importance Which Calls for Action by Congress 4 (1943).
This pamphlet, sent to fire insurance agents throughout the country, was accompanied by a National Board letter dated Sept. 23, 1943 (the complete exemption
bills had been introduced only three days before) urging that each agent write
his Congressman in support of passage of the bills but warning that agents should
write up their own views and not simply send along the printed pamphlet. Both
documents are on file at the Insurance Library Association of Boston.
27. The 1943 Hearings supra note 23 were published in six parts. Hearings
were held on Oct. 20, 27, Nov. 3, Dec. 3, 14, 15 and 21, 1943, and on Mar. 30,
May 26, 27 and June 23, 1944.
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business of insurance transacted across state lines was interstate commerce and was subject to the federal antitrust laws. 28
Congressional reaction to the decision was swift. Within a few
months both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed the
complete exemption bills.' In the Senate, however, the bills were
immediately reconsidered and then passed over." The McCarranFerguson Act, a new approach to the problem devised in cooperation
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, became
law at the next session of Congress in 1945."' Because the Act itself
28. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
The opinion was handed down on June 5, 1944. On the same day the Supreme
Court also held the insurance business to be subject to the federal labor laws.
Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
29. The principal complete exemption bill, H.R. 3270, was passed by the House
on June 22, 1944 by a roll-call vote of 283 to 54, 92 Representatives not voting'
90 CONG. Rsc. 6565 (1944). The same bill passed by voice vote in the Senate on.
Sept. 21, 1944. 90 CONG. Rc. 8054 (1944). H.R. 3270 had been reported to the
Senate favorably without amendment and without further hearing. S. Rgp. No.
1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). The bill passed in the Senate despite the fact
that six members of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senators O'Mahoney, Hatch,
Kilgore, Murdock, Wheeler and Langer filed a strong minority report in which they
asked that further action on the bill be withheld until the NAIC could present
its more balanced proposal for action by Congress. Id., Part 2, Minority views at

2, 3.
30. The reconsideration was at the request of Senators Barkley and Hatch.
90 CONG. Ric. 8054 (1944). However, most credit for withstanding this lobby
pressure and for reconsideration in the Senate of the complete exemption bills so
state insurance authorities could later present their proposals was accorded by
the press of the day to Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming. Time, Dec. 13, 1944;
p. 82; New Republic, May 29, 1944, p. 738. Senator O'Mahoney, of course, had
become quite familiar with the subject of insurance as a member of the TNEC
in 1938-40.
31. In November, 1944, the NAIC finally submitted their proposal for Congressional action in the light of South-Eastern Underwriters. This proposal, which
formed the basis for the McCarran-Ferguson Act itself, included a complete exemption from the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act
but exempted insurance from the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act only until
July 1, 1948. Even after that date the last two acts were still to be inapplicable to
rate making under state supervision, cooperative services and investigations, reinsurance, brokers' commissions, and collection of statistics or rate making jointly
if use of jointly-made rates was not compulsory. 1945 NAIC Proceedings 32. In
transmitting these proposals to Congress the Commissioners carefully indicated the
differences between the complete exemption proposed by the stock fire and casualty
companies on the one hand and the NAIC proposals, which were also endorsed by
life insurance companies and mutual fire and casualty insurance companies, on the
other. (The conflict of interests between the stock and the mutual fire and
casualty companies will be made apparent again later). Both sets of proposals
sought complete exemption from the Federal Trade Commission and RobinsonPatman Acts. But the NAIC proposal sought only limited exemption from the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. The letter accompanying the NAIC submission made
quite clear that the Commissioners recognized that certain activities of the industry should be subject to the federal antitrust laws. Letter from David A. Forbes,
Insurance Commissioner of Michigan, representing the NAIC, addressed to Senator
Vandenberg and dated Nov. 22, 1944. This letter, reprinted at 90 CONG. Pc. 8482
(1944), states in part: "The Commissioners believe that the insurance business has
no more right to ask for a blanket exclusion from these acts than has any other
business that has been held to be engaged in interstate commerce."
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is short and because of the importance of its precise language to the
discussion which follows, the full text of the Act is set out in the
margin. 32

III.
WHEN HAVE THE STATES "REGULATED"?

Now we turn to the first of the three questions considered by the
Supreme Court in National Casualty and American Hospital & Life under the language of the section 2(b) proviso of the McCarranFerguson Act, what degree of state regulation is required to exclude
application of federal statutes regulating business, especially the socalled "antitrust statutes"? The Court appears to have concluded that
mere passage by a state of prohibitory statutes covering the same
general ground as the federal acts, without more, is sufficient. The
Court claims to have based its conclusion on this point on a consideration of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
32. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares that
the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress
shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act
of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October
15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
Sec. 3. (a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as
the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as
the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of
insurance or to acts in conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate or act of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any
manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935,
as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25,
1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act
of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
Sec. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and
the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those

as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected."
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It must be recognized that the Court carefully limited its finding on
this point to the facts of the "instant cases," which presumably meant
deceptive advertising cases arising under the Federal Trade Commission Act, as distinguished from other federal antitrust statutes or
statutes regulating business.
However, careful examination of the "conventional" legislative
history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, together with the surroundings
in which that history is set, will, I believe, point to a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Court. 3 I make this statement for
four reasons.
A. The Three Purposes of the Act.
First, Congress' attention in the events leading up to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was divided among three separate topics:
preservation of general state insurance regulation; continuation of
state taxation of insurance; and applicability of the federal antitrust
laws to insurance. Congress' intentions with regard to the first two
cannot be regarded as having any bearing on its intentions with regard to the third, which alone is covered by the section 2(b) proviso.
The legislative history leading up to passage of the McCarranFerguson Act clearly indicates that, after subjection of the insurance
industry to the interstate commerce power by the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision, Congress and the insurance companies were
faced with three distinct questions. First, was general state regulation
of insurance on such matters as licensing, solvency and policy forms
now invalid because encroaching on an activity exclusively in interstate commerce? Second, was continued state taxation of the insurance business invalid for the same reason? Third, were the federal
antitrust laws applicable? And, if so, did they invalidate the direct
regulation activities of the states ?
133. It should be noted that the United States District Court in Massachusetts
apparently shares the Supreme Court's view as to the meaning of the section 2(b)
proviso. See Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 301-02
(D. Mass. 1957) (opinion by Judge Ford), aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957). And so apparently does the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D.
Cal. 1959). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to lean
toward the view taken in this paper. Crafts v. F.T.C., 244 F.2d 882, 893-94 (9th
Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 355 U.S. 9 (1957).

"It may be

conceived the actual practice in insurance regulations of a particular state may
become pertinent eventually .. " 244 F.2d 882, 893-94. (Emphasis added.) The
New York Supreme Court has indicated a definite preference for an interpretation
requiring effective, and not merely perfunctory, state action. National Bureau of
Cas. Underwriters v. Superintendent of Ins., 6 App. Div. 2d. 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d
836, 840 (1958), rev'd as moot, 6 N.Y. 2d 842, 160 N.E.2d 84 (1959).
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Congress distinctly answered the first two of these questions in
the negative and declared its clear intention to preserve general state
insurance regulation and taxation in section 2(a) of the McCarranFerguson Act, which expressly provides that the "business of insurance and every person engaged therein shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business," and in section 2(b) of that Act, which provides that
no "Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." These sections, I submit, have nothing whatever to do with the
problem, the extent to which federal antitrust laws are applicable.
This third problem was dealt with specifically and individually in
the proviso to section 2(b). Therefore, congressional statements of
intention as to its meaning must be considered by themselves.
At the outset it should be noted that debates in both houses of
Congress indicate that perhaps even less concern was devoted to
the antitrust problem than to preservation of state insurance regulation on such general matters as solvency, licensing and policy forms
and to continuation of state taxation of the industry, 4 both of which
had been so bitterly opposed for years by the companies. In fact, litigation following the McCarran-Ferguson Act certainly suggests that
these were the only subjects with which the insurance companies themselves were really seriously concerned. 5
34. See e.g., 91 CONG.

CONG. RIc. 1086 (1945)

Rtc. 481-82 (1945) (statement by Senator Radcliffe) ; 91
(statement by Mr. Walter).

35. Litigation in both federal and state courts focused on upholding the states
in their attempts to continue to tax and regulate insurance companies. The companies attempted to argue that the combination of the South-Eastern Underwriters decision and the McCarran-Ferguson Act had brought insurance under the
interstate commerce power to such an extent that the states could no longer tax
or regulate it. This argument, reminiscent of Paul v. Virginia and legislative attempts of the latter part of the 19th Century to secure federal regulation, and so
contrary to the concern of the companies during the debates on the McCarranFerguson Act regarding their liability for state taxes, provoked Mr. Justice Rutledge
to remark upon "the versatility with which argument inverts state and national
power, each in alternation to ward off the other's incidence ..
" Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 412 (1946). The courts rejected this insurance
company argument and consistently upheld state taxes on insurance, Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, supra; ,State v. Prudential Ins. Co., 224 Ind. 17, 64 N.E.2d
150 (1945), aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946); In re Insurance Tax Cases,
160 Kan. 300, 161 P.2d 726 (1945), aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 822 (1946);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 200 Miss. 233, 27 So. 2d 60 (1946), and various
state requirements imposed as prerequisites for admission of foreign insurance
companies to do business, Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (licensing
of agents); Mendola v. Dineen, 185 Misc. 540, 57 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(licensing of companies).
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The clear division between the several purposes of the McCarranFerguson Act and the limitation of the section 2(b) proviso to the
antitrust question is apparent from the legislative source materials.
As originally submitted to the Senate, S. 340, which was ultimately to become the McCarran-Ferguson Act, did not contain the
present section 2(b) proviso.36 However, even in this embryo form
of the Act, it was clear that the questions of general state regulation
and taxation of insurance were to be treated as separate from the
question of application of the antitrust laws. For example, the Senate
Committee Report on S. 340 stated:
The purpose of the bill is two fold: (1) To declare that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest; and (2) to assure
a more adequate regulation of this business in the States by suspending the application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts for
approximately two sessions of the State legislatures .... 37
The same report also concluded:
Enactment of this bill will (1) remove doubts as to the right
of the States to regulate and tax the business of insurance, and
(2) secure more adequate regulation of such business.3 8
The second purpose in each citation can only be construed as referring
to the antitrust problem.
After the section 2(b) proviso was added to S. 340 by the
Conference Committee, Senator Pepper, in attempting to determine
the meaning of the proviso in particular, made the distinction between
the three subjects of Congressional concern quite explicit, by stating
on the Senate floor:
I do not oppose State regulation which is not inconsistent
with the operation of the Sherman antitrust Act and the Clayton
Act. On matters of taxation, general regulation, and all that
sort of thing, I think the states should regulate, but I think that
now that insurance has been brought, by the decision of the
Supreme Court, up to the bar of the Clayton Act and the Sherman
Act, we should not give the3 insurance
companies immunity from
9
the applicability of those acts.

The distinction, and the limitation of the section 2(b) proviso
to antitrust questions are even more obvious from the following exchange concerning the meaning of the section 2(b) proviso in con36. S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), was introduced on Jan. 18, 1945 by
Senator McCarran for himself and Senator Ferguson. 91 CONG. R1c. 330 (1945).
37. S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
38. Id. at 3.
39. 91 CONG. RXc. 1444 (1945).
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nection with the applicability of the federal antitrust laws. Senator
Ferguson, co-author of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, stated:

I believe that a statement as to the fair construction of the
act would add to the helpfulness of what the Senator from Nevada
has said. .

.

. After the moratorium has expired, if a State has

not legislated on the subjects covered by the three acts to which
reference has been made, those acts shall be applicable to the
business of insurance. But insofar as the State is concerned
which has specifically legislated on the subject, the three acts shall
not apply.
MR. O'MAHONEY.

I believe the Senator from Michigan

went a little further than was his intention when he said that
if the States have legislated certain things will take place. The
bill says if the States have regulated.
MR.

FERGUSON.

I had reference to legislation dealing with

regulationand taxation. °

This last statement of Senator Ferguson's can only be understood in
light of the fact that Congress was concerned in connection with this
legislation with the three separate problems of state taxation of insurance companies, state regulation of those companies of a peculiarly
insurance nature, i.e., reserves, licensing and policy form provisions,
and the application of the antitrust laws. Senator Ferguson was clearly
referring only to the first two of these and not to the third although his
initial statement suggested that he was referring to the several federal
antitrust statutes expressly named in the section 2 (b) proviso.
At this point I wish only to urge that ringing congressional
declarations favoring unequivocal preservation of state general insurance regulation and taxation not be read into the section 2 (b) proviso.
B. Two Restrictive Practices Alone Considered.
Second, in the deliberations leading up to the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act Congress gave close consideration to the
impact of the federal antitrust laws on the insurance business only
with respect to two specific restrictive insurance practices - rate
making or price fixing and boycotts. Therefore, the meaning of the
word "regulated" in the section 2(b) proviso must be derived almost
exclusively from congressional consideration of those two subjects.
All of the legislative efforts of 1943-45 stemmed from the antitrust prosecution in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, which in40. 91 CoNG. Rmc. 1443 (1945).

(Emphasis added.)
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volved only two charges: rate or price fixing agreements and acts of
boycott, coercion and intimidation. Congress' eleven days of hearings
on the proposed complete exemption bills were devoted almost exclusively to these two topics, with most of the testimony centered on
the rate-making problem. 4 No hearings were held on the bill which
became the McCarran-Ferguson Act itself. The committee reports on
all of these bills show the same congressional concentration.4 2 In fact,
a proposal for a careful investigation of the entire insurance industry
was ignored.4 3 And bills which would have dealt individually with
insurance company practices under the antitrust laws were not even
considered

. 4

It is not surprising that Congress did not carefully consider the
application of the federal antitrust laws to other restrictive acts and
practices of the insurance industry. The entire problem, unfortunately,
arose and was disposed of when the attention of Congress was consumed by the war effort. Congress' attention was also distracted
by the raising of the emotion-arousing spectre of direct federal regulation of insurance, and by expressions of great concern from the
insurance companies on matters other than antitrust, such as their
continued liability for state taxes, a matter which has already been
discussed above.
C. Rate Making to be "Affirmatively" Controlled.
Third, with respect to the two insurance practices considered in
detail, acts of boycott, coercion and intimidation were subjected fully
41. 1943 Hearings,supra note 23.
42. The pertinent Congressional Committee reports are as follows. On the
complete exemption bills: H.R. RzP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943);
S. RgP. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). On S. 340, which became the
McCarran-Ferguson Act: S. RP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. REP.
No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. REP. No. 213, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945) (Conference Committee Report).
43. H.R. Rts. 382, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), filed by Mr. Lynch, called
for a thorough investigation of fire insurance and allied lines of insurance so that
Congress would have full information on which to base its action. This resolution
was referred to the House Committee on Rules, 89 CONG. Rc. 10738 (1943),
and apparently died there.
44. E.g., H.R. 4444, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), introduced by Mr. Anderson,
would have listed all of the specific insurance transactions and practices which
should be subject to the federal antitrust laws. This bill was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 90 CoNG. Rnc. 2869 (1944), and was never reported out.
During debate in the House on the complete exemption bills Mr. Anderson attempted unsuccessfullly to amend H.R. 3270 to incorporate this concept. 90 CoNG.
Rie. 6561-62 (1944).
45. E.g., 90 CoNG. RAec. 6559-60 (1944) (statement by Mr. Sumners). Senator
O'Mahoney had, however, made it quite clear, as early as the conclusion of the
TNEC investigation of life insurance, that federal regulation of the industry was
not being contemplated. O'Mahoney, Address to Insurance Forum of A.B.A. Annual
Meeting, 26 A.B.A.J. 907, 913 (1940).
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to the federal antitrust laws by section 3(b) of the McCarranFerguson Act, and, therefore, congressional consideration of them
will shed no light on the meaning of section 2(b). With regard to
the remaining topic of rate making or price fixing, congressional intention, from the very beginning, was clearly to exempt such acts from
the federal antitrust laws only to the extent that they were affirmatively
and specifically approved or controlled by the state insurance commissioners.
That this is a correct interpretation of the congressional intention
is clearly indicated by the following source materials.
1. The Legislative History of the Complete Exemption Bills.
The House Committee Report on the complete exemption bills,
which were rejected in favor of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, stated:
As a matter of fact the hearings show, through assertions
and demonstrations of Governors, State insurance commissioners,
and business organizations, that State regulation has promoted
efficiency and satisfaction in the insurance business, and that
such a result has been accomplished with a steady decrease in
insurance rates throughout the country. Under existing law which
declares ample power in the States, there is no reason why
the States should not46 continue to meet developments by the
exercise of that power.

And on the House floor during debate on these bills, Mr. Satterfield, a member of the House Committee on the Judiciary, said: "If
the States legislate and properly administer the supervision of insurance within their borders it is not necessary to invoke the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to avoid these combinations and monopolies complained of."4 7
2. The Legislative History of the McCarran-FergusonAct prior
to Insertion of the Section 2(b) Proviso.
S. 340, which was ultimately to become the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, was filed shortly after the opening of the Seventy-ninth Congress
by Senator McCarran for himself and Senator Ferguson. The bill was
quite simple in form. Section 1 declared continued regulation and
taxation by the states of the business of insurance to be in the
public interest. Section 2 provided: (a) the insurance business should
46. H.R. Rsp. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1 43). (Emphasis added.)
47. 90 CONG. Ric. 6530 (1944). (Emphasis added.) See also 90 CoNG,. Rzc.
6540 (1944) (statement of Mr. Anderson) and 90 CONG. Rc. 6545 (1944) (statement of Mr. Voorhis).
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be subject to state laws relating to its regulation and taxation; and
(b) no act of Congress should be construed to supersede any state
regulatory or tax laws unless the congressional enactment expressly
so provided. Section 3 completely exempted the insurance business
from the Federal Trade Commission and Robinson-Patman Acts.
Section 4(a) suspended the application of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts until January 1, 1948, as a "moratorium" to enable the states
and Congress to make "adjustments" and to adopt necessary legislation. Section 4(b) made clear that application of the Sherman Act
to agreements or acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation was not to
be suspended even for the moratorium period.
The Senate Committee Report on S. 340 clearly stated that the
purpose of the bill with regard to the antitrust problem was to
secure "adequate regulation and control" and "more adequate regulation" of the insurance business by the states.4" Debate on the Senate
floor did not consider this problem but centered on the question
whether it was really intended that the Sherman and Clayton Acts
should apply again to insurance after the moratorium period. Senator
Taft pointed out the contradiction between sections 2(b) and 4(a)
of the original bill in that the former section appeared to prevent the
Sherman Act from ever invalidating any state law while the latter
seemed to provide that the Sherman Act should be effective again as
to insurance after January 1, 1948. Section 2(b) was thereupon
amended to exclude the Sherman and Clayton Acts specifically from
its terms. With this amendment, the bill passed the Senate by voice
vote.49 Thus it was made quite clear at this point in the Senate that
at least the two named federal antitrust statutes were to apply, without
qualification, to insurance after the moratorium period.
Meanwhile, in the House, Mr. Walter, a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, had introduced another bill, H.R. 1973,5"
which was the same as S. 340 as originally reported to the Senate. The
House Committee Report on H.R. 1973 included statements almost
identical to those in the Senate Report on S. 340.1 In debate on the

House floor Mr. Walter emphasized that H.R. 1973, as submitted
by his committee, was the bill agreed upon by the insurance companies, the insurance commissioners and the several congressional
48. S. Fzp. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
49. Debate in the Senate on Jan. 25, 1945 appears at 91 CONG. Rvc. 478-88
(1945). The question of reapplication of -the Sherman and Clayton Acts after the
moratorium period is best brought out in the colloquy between Senator Taft and
Senators Ferguson, Radcliffe and Revercomb. 91 CONG. Ric. 485-86 (1945).
Passage of the bill by the Senate appears at 91 CoNG. Rxc. 488 (1945).

50. H.R. 1973, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
51. H.R. RxP. No. 68, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
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committee members. He claimed that S. 340, as amended and passed
by the Senate, "was not in accordance with that understanding and
."" The House debate on this point shows that the
agreement ..
concern again seems to have been the preservation of the states'
ability to pass legislation authorizing supervised fire and casualty
insurance rating bureaus without having them attacked under the
Sherman Act.
At about the same time, the House Committee on the Judiciary
reported out S. 340, but with everything after the enacting clause in
the Senate version stricken out and H.R. 1973 substituted.5" This bill
was substantially the same as S. 340 as passed by the Senate, except
that the language in section 4(a) relative to the purpose of the
moratorium period and the Senate amendment to section 2(b) were
not included. Debate on the House floor did not reach the question of the meaning of the Senate amendment, but considerable concern was expressed generally about the omission in the House version of the bill of the statement of purpose for the moratorium period
in section 4(a). Mr. Anderson protested this omission, claiming that
it was desired by the insurance industry to clarify the purpose of the
bill. He cited a press release from the insurance industry groups,
which stated the purpose of the moratorium as follows: ". . . in order
that the legislatures of the various States may have time in which to
adopt laws designed to authorize concert of action in rate making and
other cooperative activities when approved by State supervisory
officials.... ,54
".

3. Debate in the Senate on S. 340 after Insertion of the Section 2(b) Proviso.
In the Conference Committee the bill as it finally became law
was drafted. The Conference Report, submitted on February 22,
1945, states only that the principal difference between the conference
bill and the bill as passed by the House was the inclusion of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act in the
moratorium provision, which had previously been section 4(a) and
now became section 3(a). The report was, however, silent as to the
most significant change in the previous bill. At the end of what had
previously been section 2(b), a proviso was now added for the first
time, which stated that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, all as amended, after the moratorium
52. 91 CONG. Rtc. 978-79 (1945).
53. H.R. Ri. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
54. 91 CONG. REc. 1089 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
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period "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law.""5
The Conference Report was agreed upon in the House without
debate,5" so that source gives no help in interpreting the meaning of
the new proviso expressing a conditional applicability of the federal
antitrust laws. However, debate on the Senate floor centered largely
around this point, and the intent in that body is clear.
When Senator Murdock, a member of the Committee on the
Judiciary, asked: "So that during the moratorium it is intended, is
it not, that the States shall affirmatively step into the regulation of
the insurance business?"; Senator McCarran replied: "That is correct.""7
The following colloquy draws a clear distinction between the
terms "legislate" and "regulate." Senator Pepper stated that he was "a
little disturbed by what I have discovered in paragraph (b) of setion 2." and continued:
Does that mean that after January 1, 1948, the States may
determine whether or not the Sherman and the other acts become applicable to the business of insurance?
MR. MCCARRAN.

The answer to that question is "Yes."

During the 3-year moratorium the States may, if they see fit
to do so, enact legislation for the purpose of regulation. If they
do enact such legislation, to the extent that they regulate they will
have taken the business of insurance in the respective States out
from under the Sherman Anti-trust Act, the Clayton Act, and the
other acts."'
Apparently still not satisfied, Senator Pepper continued:
I shall not consent to postponing until January 1, 1948, the
effective date of the law, and according to the States the privilege
of enacting some mild form of legislation which they may call
regulatory, thereby defeating the purpose of the Supreme Court
decision and defeating the act itself. Apparently the conference
report goes further than I had understood it to go. It does not
stop with a moratorium at the end of 3 years. At the end of 3
years the moratorium would continue if in the meantime a State
had regulated the business to any extent whatever. That would
defeat the Supreme Court decision.
MR. MCCARRAN. The moratorium would not be continued;
but if in the meantime the States themselves had regulated the
55. See H.R. RP. No. 213, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
statement of the Managers on the part of the House, Id. at 3.

56. 91 CONG. Rzc. 1396 (1945).
57. 91 CONG. Rvc. 1442 (1945).

58. 91

CONG.

See especially the

(Emphasis added.)

Rtc. 1443 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
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business of insurance, the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the
other acts would not become effective.5 9
Senator McCarran's statement can only be taken as a reassuring reply to Senator Pepper's inquiry of concern.
Probably the most clearly expressive passage in the entire Senate
debate as to the meaning of the section 2(b) proviso, which quite
strangely I have not found cited in any of the literature considering
this problem, is the following exchange:
MR. MURDOCK. Mr. President, does the Senator from Maine
take the position that, under the conference report, it becomes
necessary for the Congress to act again affirmatively subsequent
to any State action taken?
MR. WHITE. Not at all; that is not my view of the matter
at all. My view is that the State may regulate. If, however, the
State goes only to the point indicated, then these Federal statutes
apply throughout the whole field beyond the scope of the State's
activity.
MR. MCCARRAN. That is a correct statement.
MR. MURDOCK. Without any subsequent action on the part
of Congress ?
MR. WHITE. Without any subsequent action on the part
of Congress.
MR. MURDOCK.

I think that therein lies a very important

feature of this whole matter. I agree thoroughly with the Senator
from Maine that insofar as the States step into the picture
affirmatively and act by regulation, they may do so. As the
Senator from Wyoming has said, we convey no authority, we
simply recognize their right to regulate. Insofar as they fail to
cover the same ground covered by the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, those acts become effective again.
MR. BARKLEY.
I should like to ask, in this connection,
whether, where States attempt to occupy the field - but do it
inadeq iately - by going through the form of legislation so as to
deprive the Clayton Act. the Sherman Act, and the other acts of
their jurisdiction, it is the Senator's interpretation of the conference report that in a case of that kind, where the legislature fails
adequately even to deal with the field it attempts to cover, these
acts still would apply?

MR.

MCCARRAN.

59. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
60. 91 CoNG. Rnc. 1444 (1945).

That is my interpretation.60
(Emphasis added.)
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Many other instances from the legislative history could be cited,6"
but those above should suffice.
4. ExtracurricularStatements by Key Congressmen.
Several statements made outside the floor debates by Congressmen responsible for the McCarran-Ferguson Act are extremely helpful. Congressman Sumners of Texas, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, stated that the states must "demonstrate their
ability properly to govern the business of insurance. '"02 Senator
O'Mahoney, a key figure in this entire sequence of legislative events
and a member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, referred to
the purpose of the new law as "strengthening State regulation and prohibiting the evils of private monopoly."6' 3 The most significant of these
statements came several years later from Senator McCarran himself
when he made quite clear that, by the section 2(b) proviso, Congress
meant that the states should regulate "affirmatively and effectively." On
that same occasion Senator McCarran spelled out what steps in state
regulation were necessary in order to exclude the federal antitrust
laws: (1) an explicit state law regulating the particular practice;
(2) a prohibitory rather than a permissive statute; (3) machinery for
regulation; (4) authority specifically assigned for regulation; (5)
general standards to govern the discretion of the regulatory authority;
and (6) provisions for public notice of violations, hearing and appeal.

64

5. Congress' Practice in Granting Conditional Exemptions from
the Antitrust Laws for Rate Fixing.
Congress' normal practice in granting exemptions to specific regulated or semi-regulated industries from the federal antitrust laws,
particularly with regard to inter-company agreements fixing rates,
was to exempt such agreements only to the extent that they had been
specifically "approved" by an appropriate regulatory agency. 65 In
61. E.g., 91 CONG. Rsc. 1481-82 (1945) (statement by Senator Murdock);
91 CONG. Rtc. 1486 (1945) (statement by Senator O'Mahoney).
62. 91 CONG. Rtc. A 1168-69 (1945). (Emphasis added.)

63. 91 CoNG. R.c. A 1626 (1945), quoting an article by Senator O'Mahoney,
The New Federal Insurance Law, which appeared .in America magazine for March
31, 1945. (Emphasis added.)
64. McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Public Law
See
(Emphasis added.)
15 Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 540, 542 (1948).
also McCarran, Insurance as Commerce, 23 NOTRii DAMz LAW,' 299, 307
310 (1948).
65. E.g., 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958) (shipping
rate agreements approved by the Federal Maritime Board). This Congressional
policy is also shown by the relatively contemporary (to the McCarran-Ferguson
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light of the various statements made during the debates cited above,
it is almost impossible to conclude that Congress was departing from
this established policy.
6. The District of Columbia Rate Regulation Bill Precedent.
Early in 1944 Congress had enacted a regulatory fire insurance
rate law which was patterned after several of the state insurance rate
regulation laws which will be discussed in detail later in this paper.
This law provided for fixing of insurance rates by rating bureaus
with control over rates through power of approval or disapproval
ultimately vested in the Superintendent of Insurance for the District.6 6
That Congress, in considering the McCarran-Ferguson Act, was fully
aware of this earlier legislation and was in fact deriving the meaning
of the word "regulated" in the section 2(b) proviso from the basic
concept of the District of Columbia rating bill is shown in several
statements on the floor of Congress by members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. For example:
MR. FERGUSON ...
I think that if nothing else comes of the
hearings before our committee, we may awaken in the minds of
the insurance commissioners and the people back home that they
ought to spend more time and effort in making rules and regulations which will eliminate any vicious practices from the insurance business. Some of them have taken for granted that if
they have an insurance commissioner the business is properly
regulated....
MR. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I may add to what the
able Senator from Michigan has very properly stated that Congress within 6 weeks has passed a bill providing for a rating
bureau to be maintained in connection with the operation of insurance in the District of Columbia. That bill was known to us,
the pendency of the bill was known, and considered by the
members of the subcommittee, although it came out of the Committee on the District of Columbia.

I can say to the insurance industry that the fact that that
bill was passed without controversy is in itself an indication that
the Congress does not regard, and certainly I do not regard,
the institution of a rating bureau as a monopolistic practice.
Combinations can be made for wholly beneficial purposes. My
Act)

Congressional reaction in the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, 62

(1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(2), (9) (1958), amending 24 Stat. 380 (1887)

Stat. 472

(common

carrier rate agreements approved by the I.C.C.), to the Supreme Court's decision
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
66. P.L. 327, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), 58 Stat. 267 (1944), D.C. CODS
ANN. §§ 35-1401 - 35-1409 (1951).
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whole point has always been that those combinations which the
insurance industry desires to make should have a clearance from
some authoritative spokesman of the public interest.61
7. The Understanding of the Executive Department and Others
as to the Meaning of the Section 2(b) Proviso.
During debate in the Senate on the original version of S. 340
Senator Radcliffe called attention to a letter written to him by President Roosevelt in response to an inquiry as to the government's intentions regarding direct federal regulation of insurance. The President's letter of January 2, 1945, read in part as follows:
But there is no conflict between the application of the antitrust laws and effective State regulation of insurance companies,
and there is no valid reason for giving any special exemption from
the antitrust laws to the business of insurance. The antitrust
laws prohibit private rate fixing arrangements between insurance
companies and acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The
antitrust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the States such as agreed insurance rates if they are
affirmatively approved by State officials.6"
Also most significant is the statement made by President Roosevelt on signing the McCarran-Ferguson Act into law:
After the moratorium period, the antitrust laws and certain
related statutes will be applicable in full force and effect to the
business of insurance except to the extent that the states have
assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that
responsibility, for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insur-ance business may be involved. 9
A statement to the same effect was made by the then Attorney
General Biddle, and similar interpretations have been voiced subsequently by various Department of Justice and other government
officials.

7

1

67. 90 CONG. Ric. 6627 (1944). (Emphasis added.) See also 90 CONG. Rzc.
6540 (1944) (statement of Mr. Anderson) (He was the author of the District of
Columbia rating bill) ; 91 CONG. R4c. 1481 (1945) (statement of Senator Ferguson).
68. The letter is reproduced in full at 91 CONG. Rrc. 482 (1945). (Emphasis.
added.) •
69. White House Press Release, March 10, 1945, 13 PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRSSS
op FRANKLIN DELANO ROOs V=La" 587 (Rosenman ed. 1950). (Emphasis added.)
70. Statement of Attorney General Biddle, Nov. 11, 1944, before the Drafting
Committee of State Officials of the Council of State Governments, quoted at 1945,

A.B.A. Sicw. or INs. LAW PROCUDINGS 105; Bergson, Regulation v. Competition, 1956
INs. L.J. 703, 706, 708; Hansen, Anti-trust and Regulation Problems in Insurance,

Address to the University of Arizona Program on Insurance Regulation, Tucson,

Arizona, Jan. 21, 1958. Official Dept. of Justice Mimeo. Release at 20-21. The last
two-named authors are former Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the
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This view has also been adopted by representatives of the insurance industry, 7 by various insurance commissioners, 2 and by the
large majority of independent commentators who have studied the
3

question.T

8. Previous Decisions of the Supreme Court.
Apparently the basic concept of the section 2(b) proviso of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was derived from a ferry regulation statute
passed by the first Congress which is considered as having established the so-called "congressional consent to state regulation" doctrine, but judicial decisions interpreting that statute do not appear
to have considered the instant question. 4 Nor are certain decisions
arising under the somewhat similar Federal Power Act very helpful,
although cited by the F.T.C. in its brief before the Supreme Court
Antitrust Division. See also Michels, Insurance - The Case Against Broad Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 66, 72 (1960). The author was then
Special Assistant to the General Counsel, F.T.C.
71. Keesling, The Impact of the Sherman Act on Insurance, 1944 AMERICAN
LIFE CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 70, 74. The author was then President and General
Counsel of the West Coast Life Insurance Company.
72. Dineen, The Rating Problem, 1945 A.B.A. SwcT. ov INS. LAW PROCEEDINGS
104, 107 (The author was then Superintendent of Insurance of New York) ; Knowlton,
Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission over Trade Practices of Insurers,
1955 INs. L.J. 673, 675 (The author was then Insurance Commissioner of New
Hampshire) ; Maloney, Federal Regulation of Insurance, 1960 INS. L.J. 363, 365-66
(The author was formerly Insurance Commissioner of California). See also N.Y.
Ops. ATr'y GEN., Feb. 10, 1947, 1947 N.Y. ArT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 200, TRADE REG.
RZp. (Trade Cas. 1946-1947)
57,549.
73. SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE 78-82 (1945); 1948 A.B.A.
Sect. of Ins. Law Proceedings, Report of Committee on Regulation of Insurance
Companies 248-51; Chappell, Federal Legislation: Insurance under the McCarranFerguson Act, 39 GEo. L.J. 321, 324, 326 (1945) ; Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance
Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of Regulated Competition, 107 U. PA.
L. Rsv. 199, 200 (1958); Dowling, Congress and Insurance, 5 J. PuB. L. 110,
113 (1956); Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation:
the McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REv. 545, 576
(1958); Orfield, Improving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. REv. 219,
224, 231 (1948). For a contrary view, see Chellberg, Regulation of Insurance - The
State-Federal Controversy, 7 DE PAUL L. REv. 25, 37-39 (1957) ; Naujoks, Regulation of the Insurance Business and Public Law No. 15, 30 MARQ. L. REv. 77, 91
(1946).
74. The statute in question is 1 Stat. 54 (1789), 46 U.S.C. § 211 (1958), in
which Congress declared that pilotage should continue to be regulated by state laws
until further provision was made by Congress. This was the statute upheld
in the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
It appears that the section 2(b) proviso of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was based
upon this early statute as the result of a suggestion made by Thomas I. Parkinson,
who had worked at the Columbia Law School on a project involving the "congressional consent" doctrine. Parkinson was later president of the Equitable Life
Assurance Society. See Dowling, supra note 73, at 111. For a detailed examination
of the congressional consent doctrine as such, see Note, Congressional Consent to
Discriminatory Legislation, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 927 (1945). The doctrine appears to
sustain what would otherwise be discriminatory state statutes taxing insurance, such
as higher taxes on foreign than on domestic insurance companies, "retaliatory" tax
laws, and laws granting a lower tax rate if a certain proportion of assets attributable
to policies issued in a particular state is invested in that state.
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in the National Casualty and American Hospital & Life cases on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act question, because the particular statutory
provision there involved was the result of a specific contrary judicial
decision." It is also frequent practice to cite certain state decisions
which have given definitions for the term "regulate," 6 but these decisions are not at all helpful because they only determine that the
term includes the power to issue detailed rules and regulations. Our
problem, of course, is whether the term includes an obligation to that
effect.
Strong additional support for the broader view of the word
"regulated" can be drawn from Parker v. Brown,77 a Supreme Court
decision holding that a mandatory state program to control production and distribution of raisins exempted the participants from the
federal antitrust laws. The state program there upheld involved
detailed state administrative regulation and enforcement machinery
and elimination of price competition. The debates in Congress leading
up to the McCarran-Ferguson Act show repeatedly and clearly that
this decision, then quite recent, was heavily relied upon as the basis
for partial and conditional exemption of insurance rate making from
the federal antitrust laws." Also helpful is another Supreme Court
decision holding that sales of natural gas by an interstate pipeline
carrier directly to industrial consumers, though in interstate commerce,
are subject to state regulation. This latter case even drew an analogy
to the McCarran-Ferguson Act and concluded: "The Natural Gas
Act created an articulate legislative program based on a clear recognition of the respective responsibilities of the federal and state regulatory agencies. It does not contemplate ineffective regulation at either
level." 79
75. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. F.P.C., 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945) ; United
States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 300-11 (1953), both construing
§ 201(a) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 847 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)
(1958). These cases were cited as authority by the F.T.C. in the National
Casualty and American Hospital & Life cases. See Brief for the Petitioner, p. 50.
The Supreme Court's decision on the question now under consideration may be attributable, at least in part, to inadequate presentation in the F.T.C. brief of the
materials available in support of its position.
76. State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club, Inc. v. Stein, 133 Fla. 530, 539-45, 182
So. 863, 867-69 (1938); Van Ingen v. Hudson Realty Co., 106 App. Div. 444, 448,
94 N.Y. Supp. 645, 648-49 (1905). These cases were, for example, cited by the
F.T.C. in support of its interpretation of the section 2(b) proviso in F.T.C. Press
Release and Memorandum, April 28, 1950, p. 6 (a comprehensive survey of state
insurance regulatory laws).
77. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
78. E.g., 91 CONG. RJc. 1480 (1945) (statement by Senator O'Mahoney).
79. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S.
507, 520-21 (1947), construing 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 717
(1958). (Emphasis added.)
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D. Other Restrictive PracticesTreated the Same.
Fourth, the congressional intention to exempt rate making or
price fixing from the federal antitrust laws only to the extent that
such practices were specifically and affirmatively approved or controlled by the state insurance commissioners was clearly extended to
restrictive practices subject to antitrust laws other than the Sherman
Act - to the Clayton Act,"0 the Federal Trade Commission Act and
the Robinson-Patman Act,"' although detailed consideration was not
given to each of those practices.
Section 4(a) of S. 340, as originally submitted, to the Senate
and first passed by both the Senate and the House, specifically suspended application of both the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the business of insurance only for the moratorium period. However, section 3
of that same bill expressly exempted the insurance business from the
Federal Trade Commission and Robinson-Patman Acts without any
limit of time or other qualification. This complete exemption troubled
a number of members of the House, when S. 340 was originally debated.
For example, Mr. Cochran said to Mr. Walter:
The gentleman certainly does not want to stand on the floor
of this House and tell the Members that he is in favor of insurance
companies or insurance brokers putting out false advertising in
connection with the conduct of their business.
To Mr. Walter's reply that "we" were not concerned with that sort of
thing, Mr. Cochran retorted: "I, as one Member, will not vote for the
moratorium if you leave section 3 in the bill." 2 At least three other
members of the House also questioned the section 3 exemptions.8 "
These objections prompted Mr. Kefauver, a member of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, shortly before conclusion of debate in the
House to express grave doubt as to the wisdom of section 3 and to
state:
Also, in conference, I greatly hope that the provisions of section 3 may be included in section 4-a as I do not think at this
time we have enough information to justify the permanent exclusion of8 4these two acts insofar as they relate to the business of
insurance.
80. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, as amended (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.).

81. Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526, as amended (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
82. 91 CONG. Rrc. 1086 f(1945).
83. 91 CONG. Rnc. 1089 (1945) (statement by Mr. Anderson); 91 CONG. RZc.
1089 (1945) (statement by Mr. Patman) ; 91 CONG. RZc. 1091 (1945) (statement by
Mr. Bailey).
84. 91 CONG. RUc. 1092 (1945).
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The Conference Committee apparently adopted this view since, as
pointed out earlier, the Federal Trade Commission and RobinsonPatman Acts were included in the Conference Committee version of the
bill as part of the moratorium provision which had now become
section 3(a). At the same time the Federal Trade Commission Act,
as amended, was specifically included in the new section 2(b) proviso.8 5
It seems almost impossible to argue that the two additional antitrust
statutes would have been included in both the section 3(b) moratorium and the section 2(b) proviso subject to an interpretation different from that clearly intended with regard to the two statutes
which had been included in the moratorium provision from the beginning. The impossibility of this argument is confirmed by the repeated
references to the "Sherman Anti-trust Act, the Clayton Act, and the
other acts" in the Senate discussion of the meaning of the word
"regulated" in the section 2(b) proviso as reported by the Conference
Committee.8 6
E. Conclusion.
There would seem to be little- question that something more than
mere legislation is required of the states under the section 2(b)
proviso of the McCarran-Ferguson Act if they are to avoid the application of the federal antitrust laws, even absent any change in the
present form of that Act. It also seems fairly clear that the required
state regulation, which might be accomplished either through direct
administrative supervision or through application of state antitrust
laws, must meet rather definite and workable standards. The following would seem to be the minimal requirements:
1. Specific statutory provisions paralleling the provisions of the
federal antitrust laws and covering the same specific areas such as
cooperative rate making, mergers, interlocking directorates and price
discrimination.
2. Administrative agencies and machinery authorized and actually established to administer and enforce these laws. Such agencies
would, of course, have to be adequately financed and staffed.
85. The failure to refer to the Robinson-Patman Act by name in the section
2(b) proviso, as was done in the section 3(a) moratorium provision, raises a nice
question whether the Robinson-Patman Act is covered by the section 2(b) proviso.
The NAIC thought so on the ground that the Robinson-Patman Act was, at least in
part, an amendment of the Clayton Act, and the section 2(b) proviso does refer
to the Clayton Act "as amended." 1947 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 183. See also Stone
& Campbell, Insurance and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1949 INS. L.J. 533, 555-56.
For a contrary view, see Glassie, Insurance and the Robinson-Patman Act: Revisited,
1957 INS. L.J. 85, 96-100.
86. See, e.g., notes 58 and 60 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Provision for bringing suitable legal or administrative proceedings, with power to conduct investigations, hold hearings, issue
appealable cease and desist orders, and impose fines and other suitable penalties, such as revocation of a license to do business.
IV.
How

EFFECTIVE IS

STATE REGULATION

OF INSURANCE?

If Congress, in the section 2(b) proviso of the McCarranFerguson Act, intended to make the federal antitrust laws applicable to
insurance to the extent that that business has not been affirmatively
and effectively regulated by the states themselves, we must next
inquire into the second problem presented to the Supreme Court in
the National Casualty and American Hospital & Life cases - to what
extent have the states achieved the requisite degree of regulation?
The Supreme Court, of course, considered this issue only with
regard to the accident and health insurance advertising problem immediately before it and decided, on its more limited reading of the
section 2(b) proviso, that the mere existence of unfair trade practice
statutes in the large majority of states, without more, excluded the
application of the Federal Trade Commission Act. I do not propose
to undertake a detailed examination of the actual enforcement activities of the states against deceptive insurance advertising practices
under their unfair trade practice statutes as compared with the
effectiveness of enforcement activities of the F.T.C. itself; nor do I
propose to examine the quality of state regulation with regard to
every possible insurance industry practice which might constitute a
federal antitrust violation. Topics such as exclusive channels of distribution, collective refusals to deal, monopoly, mergers, interlocking
directorates and price discrimination would each require individual
treatment for adequate consideration.
Instead I have chosen to examine closely only two insurance industry practices - one primarily characteristic of fire and casualty
insurance, and the other involving both property and life insurance which, in the absence of effective state regulation, under the interpretation of the section 2(b) proviso advocated above might be regarded
as violating existing federal antitrust laws. In order to make this
evaluation of state action as realistic as possible, the discussion will
87
focus particularly on Massachusetts law for illustrative purposes.
87. Massachusetts was selected because of its long history of active supervision of insurance and because it is the domiciliary state of many important insurance
companies. For example, in the life insurance field, the John Hancock Mutual Life

Insurance Company and the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company of
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A. Rate Making or Price Fixing.
Cooperative rate making or price fixing in insurance is characteristic of property insurance rather than of life insurance. Rates, or
rather premiums, for the latter form of insurance are fixed by individual companies although, of course, a considerable degree of
uniformity is introduced through use of standard mortality tables.
Since most rate making problems in property insurance have arisen in
connection with fire, rather than casualty, insurance, the discussion
which follows will concentrate primarily on fire insurance rates.
Here again a brief historical survey is essential for full understanding of the present problem areas.
1. History.
Joint making of fire insurance rates in the United States began as
early as 1806.88 For the next sixty years, however, fire insurance was
marked by extreme competition with predatory rate cutting which
resulted in many company failures.8 " The combination of these practices and the disastrous losses following the Civil War led the companies in 1866, as noted earlier, to organize the National Board of
Fire Underwriters to serve as a nation-wide cooperative rate-making
bureau." However, demoralization in the industry soon led to a new
intensive period of rate cutting in the 1870s. During this period local
and regional rating bureaus assumed, on a somewhat lesser scale, the
rate-making functions previously performed by the National Board.
The industry, however, again suffered devastating losses as a result of
new conflagrations, particularly the great Chicago fire, which led
again to cooperative rate making on a comprehensive scale. 91
Boston and the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company of Springfield; in
the fire and casualty field, the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company of Boston and
the Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Springfield.

88. BPZARLY, THg HISTORY
UNDERWRITERS 283-84 (1916).

op

THIE

NATIONAL

BOARD

OF

FIR

INSURANCE

89. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 73, at 547-48.
90. The reasons for the huge fire insurance company losses in the 10 years ending
in 1866 are well summarized in a report of the Massachusetts legislature's Committee
on Insurance, which considered and rejected action to curb cooperative rate making.
The reasons given for the poor industry experience were hasty loss estimates and
premium calculations; demoralization and widespread fraud brought on by the
Civil War; the general scramble for business in the South during the Reconstruction
period; and highly unusual conflagration losses, e.g., the Portland, Maine fire of
1866, which wiped out $3,504,700 of insurance capital in a single day and which
alone led to the winding up of many companies. See MASS. S. Rir. No. 385,
June 8, 1869.
91. Oviatt, History of Fire Insurance in the United States, in ZARTMAN & PRICE,
YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE, PROPERTY INSURANcE, 70, 88-92 (2d ed. 1914);
Klitzke, Fire Insurance Rates and the Law, 1956 INS. L.J. 631, 632. A study made
in 1935 listed two national fire insurance industry associations concerned with
general supervision over rate making policy, the National Board of Fire Under-
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As a consequence, the 1880s found the Western and Southern
states attempting to apply their general state antitrust statutes to the
insurance price fixing combinations. In some state courts these efforts
met with success.9 2 In others they did not.93 Both groups of cases
turned in large part on the question whether insurance was an "article"
or "commodity," a problem which, as will be seen later, is still of
importance under at least one of the present federal antitrust statutes
and many of the present state antitrust laws. In some states the issue

never rose above contradictory lower court decisions and thus was
94
left in a state of confusion.
Other attacks on these combinations were made under the common law of restraint of trade, again with mixed success.9 5 Therefore, the states began to pass specific "anti-compact" laws directed
writers and the Insurance Executives Association. In addition, rates were
made by the following regional "bureau" Organizations, most of which
more than one state and the makeup of which is substantially the same
Eastern, 1 Southern, 2 Pacific, and 2 Western, and various state rating

actually
covered
today, 8
bureaus.

See WANDL, THE CONTROL Ol COMPETITION IN Fn INSURANCE 17 (1935).

This

book is an excellent study of the entire history of self-government in the fire
insurance industry. Similar rating bureaus exist in the field of casualty insurance,
which includes workmen's compensation, burglary, theft and robbery, plate glass
breakage, automobile, steam boiler and machinery, and sprinkler leakage, etc., insurance. MICHZLBACHSR, CASUALTY INSURANCE PRINCIPLES, 1-14 (1930). However,
in these forms of insurance most bureaus operate on a national basis. MAG9E,
PROPERTY INSURANCE 55 (3d ed. 1955). For a list of the bureaus operating in the
various casualty insurance fields, see 1943 Hearings, supra note 23, at 316-17
(testimony of Mr. E. L. Williams, President, Insurance Executives Association).
Examples are the National Automobile Underwriters Association and the Sprinkler
Leakage Conference.
92. Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 70 N.W. 107 (1897); State v. Phipps,
50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097 (1893); American Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 75 Miss. 24, 22
So. 99 (1897).
93. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899)
(alternative holding) ; Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893)
(alternative holding). The Queen Insurance case, one of the earliest cases involving insurance rate combinations, was either relied upon or distinguished by
many of the cases in other states during this same period. It was based principally
on the view that insurance was not "trade" or "commerce" and cited Paul v.
Virginia on this point. That the status of insurance was not being adequately analyzed
is suggested by the decision of a Texas court several years later that the business
of an insurance agent was a "trade or profession" for purposes of exempting certain of his office property from an attachment statute. Betz v. Maier, 12 Tex.
Civ. App. 219, 33 S.W. 710 (1896).
94. In Ohio insurance price-fixing combinations were held both to be in
violation, State ex rel. Taylor v. Ross, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377 (C.P. 1906), and
not to be in violation, Foster v. Ankenbauer, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 637 (C.P. 1913),
State v. Bovee, 6 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (C.P. 1907), of that state's general antitrust statute,
95. Holding a violation of common law: People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins.
Co., 126 Ill. App. 636 (1906); Metzger v. Cleveland & Adams, 28 INS. L.J. 176
(Ind. Super. Ct. 1899). Holding no such violation: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth,
106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899) (alternative holding); People ex rel. Pinckney
v. New York Board of Fire Underwriters, 54 How. Pr. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875),
aff'd, 7 Hun 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24
S.W. 397 (1893) (alternative holding); Harris v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 746,
73 S.E. 561 (1912). For an English case taking substantially the same negative
view under the common law, see Workman v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co.,
19 T.L.R. 360 (Ch. Div. 1903).
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expressly at rate-making combinations in insurance."6 Convictions
under these statutes were readily obtained and confirmed. 97 And, although some lower federal courts thought otherwise, the United States
Supreme Court viewed these new statutes as perfectly constitutional.9
Not to be outdone iningenuity, the fire insurance companies promptly
abandoned their formal rating bureaus and joint organizations and
began to "subscribe" to "private rating services." The employees
of these organizations were former employees of the rating bureaus;
the old rate books were still used; but the new rates were viewed as
"advisory" only and not binding on any particular company. Of
course, all companies observed them. 9 The courts, however, refused
to be fooled by the veneer and regularly invalidated these groups as
well under the anti-compact laws.'
One of these private rating services, which was euphemistically described as the "Social Club of St.
Joseph, Mo.," was bitingly evaluated by the Supreme Court of Missouri
as "a plain, palpable, but bungling, pool, trust, agreement, combination,
confederation and understanding organized to evade the antitrust laws
of Missouri but wholly inefficient for such a purpose."''
Such company "ruses" even led some states to pass statutes specifically forbidding evasion of the anti-compact statutes by the use of "rate books"
or "advisory" organizations. This caused the companies to retaliate
by simply withdrawing from the state concerned and ceasing to write
10 2
new business there.
96. The first such law was apparently Ohio's in 1885. Brearly, op. cit. supra
note 88, at 289. Between 1885 and 1912 some 22 other states enacted statutes of this
type, including, in order of enactment, New Hampshire, Michigan, Kansas, Georgia,
Maine, Missouri, Iowa, Alabama, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Virginia, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, Oregon,
Washington, Arizona and Louisiana. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 555 n.43 (1944).
97. In re Pinkney, 47 Kan. 89, 27 Pac. 179 (1891); State ex inf. Crow v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 150 Mo. 113, 51 S.W. 413 (1899); State v. American Sur. Co.,
91 Neb. 22, 135 N.W. 365 (1912), setting aside earlier contrary opinion, 90 Neb.
154, 133 N.W. 235 (1911).
98. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905) (upholding the Iowa
anti-compact statute). Contra, Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. 816
(C.C.D. Neb. 1901) (holding the Nebraska anti-compact statute invalid).
99. Bohlinger, The Impact of the Federal Antitrust Laws Upon Insurance Rates
in the United States, an address before the Insurance Conference, Munich, Germany,
Dec. 11, 1956, p. 3. The author is a former Superintendent of Insurance of New

York. A copy of the address is on file at the- Insurance Library Association of
Boston.
100. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 38 N.W. 474
(1888) ; MICH. ATT'Y GtN. ANN. RtP., Opinion No. 4, p. 27 (1888).
101. State ex rel. Crow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595
(1899).
102. Events in South Carolina illustrate the confusion created. In 1916 the
legislature enacted an anti-compact law specifically forbidding use of rate books

and advisory organizations.

This was the Laney-Odum Bill, 29 Stats. of S.C.

No. 371 (1916). The foreign fire insurance companies replied by withdrawing from
the state, 96 SP-CrAOR 210 (1916), and suing to enjoin enforcement of the statute,
the validity of which was upheld in court, Henderson v. McMaster,. 104 S.C. 268, 88
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State curbs on rate-fixing combinations were not, however,
limited to direct methods. Statutes were passed and upheld which
imposed twenty-five per cent penalty charges on the amount of loss
payable to the insured if the fire insurer was a member of a ratefixing combination."' 3 Normal policy terms protecting the insurance
company, such as proof of loss requirements, were altered, 10 4 and even
entire policies voided.' 5 Some state statutes automatically revoked
certificates of authority to do business. 06
Because of the great disruption of normal insurance services to
the general public caused by the legal assaults on the rating bureaus, it
was soon suspected that attempting to eliminate the rate-fixing combinations might not be the best solution to the problem. Serious
general doubt was expressed as a result of exhaustive investigation into
fire insurance practices by the Merritt Committee in New York in
1911,07 as a result of which New York passed one of the early laws
specifically authorizing the fixing of fire insurance rates by the rating
bureaus with general supervision to be exercised by the state insurS.E. 645 (1916). Because of the injury to a public unable to purchase insurance,
a new statute authorizing the rating bureaus under general state supervision was
enacted in 1917, 30 Stats. of S.C. No. 183 (1917). The companies then reentered the state and began to write business again. Eastern Underwriter, Mar.
2, 1917, p. 16, col. 1.
103. These statutes were upheld both by state courts, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
161 Ala. 600, 50 So. 73 (1909); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hellner, 159 Ala. 447,
49 So. 297 (1909); and by the United States Supreme Court, German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911) (construing the Alabama statute), against
constitutional objections. However, these statutes being considered penal in nature,
the situations in which they would be applied were carefully limited. See Southern
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kronenberg, 199 Ala. 164, 74 So. 63 (1917) (no penalty
where company conducted only incidental correspondence with rating bureau).
104. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 161 Ala. 600, 50 So. 73 (1909); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Parkes, 142 Ala. 650, 39 So. 204 (1907).
105. E.g., Miss. LAWS 1900, ch. 88. But enforcement of this statute was refused
against an insurance company suing under a right of subrogation from its insured
under the policy because that right was considered as merely derivative and unrelated to the business of the rate-making combination. Freed v. American Fire
Ins. Co., 90 Miss. 72, 43 So. 947 (1907).
106. Suits in the federal courts to enjoin such statutes brought varying results.
Injunction granted: Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Clunie, 88 Fed.
160 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). Injunction denied: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Perkins,
125 Fed. 502 (C.C.D.S.D. 1903), appeal dismissed, 196 U.S. 643 (1905). The Maryland Attorney-General refused to recommend that the Governor enforce such a
statute because he thought rate-making combinations were in the public interest.
Md. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Jan. 17, 1912, appearing as printed pamphlet on file at the
Insurance Library Association of Boston.
107. Kansas had apparently passed the first new statute in 1909, under which
the insurance commissioner was given the power to review required filings of
proposed rates and to order reductions whenever he felt those rates excessive.
Kan. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 152. However, the first really exhaustive analysis of the
defects of the anti-compact laws and the merits of cooperative action under state
supervision appears in 1 Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York Appointed to Investigate Corrupt Practices In
Connection with Legislation and the Affairs of Insurance Companies Other than
Those Doing Life Insurance Business. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 30, 134th Sess. 41-51,
76-78 (1911). This is the Merritt Committee Report, which was published in three
volumes.
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ance department.10 8 Doubt as to the adequacy of mere general supervision of the bureau activities led to a further investigation by the
Lockwood Committee in New York in 1922, as a result of which the
New York rating law was amended to provide for closer state control
over rating bureaus and for regular reviews of rates proposed.' 0 9
Statutes of this same general type had already been held constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court." 0 Under this rate "approval"
type statute it was soon established that the rates fixed were binding
as to all companies unless an individual company could show that
the rates were confiscatory as to it," and that any insurer might join
the rating bureau for rating purposes but need not agree to be bound by
any other rules of the associations, such as those concerning levels of
commissions or number of agencies." 2 At the same time other states,
notably Texas, delegated outright rate-setting power to the state
supervisory authorities, and rates so established were held to be absolutely binding on all insurers without exception.11
Despite these settling statutory developments in some states, in
others the battle under the state anti-compact and antitrust laws continued." 4 As late as 1934 Florida held that insurance was not an
108. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 460, which became N.Y. INs. LAW § 181.

109. Intermediate Report on the Joint Legislative Committee on Housing (Lockwood Committee), Leg. Doc. No. 60, pp. 199, 224, 251 (1922). This report led to
amendment of N.Y. Ins. Law § 181.
110. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (upholding the
Kansas statute). To the same effect, Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Shanks, 14 F.2d 690
(E.D. Ky. 1926) (upholding the Kentucky statute). Developments during this
period are well described in Moser, Operation of Independents Under the Rate
Regulatory Pattern, 15 LAw & CONT.MP. PROB. 523, 526 (1950).
111. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928). To the same effect, see
American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 67 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1946), which was
reversed on appeal because of failure of the trial court to make specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law, Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d
281 (D.C. Cir. 1948). For a general review of this new rating legislation and a
useful bibliography of contemporary material, see Riegel, The Legal Status of
Fire Underwriters Associations, Part II, 97 EcoNoMic WORLD 85 (1916).
112. Importers & Exporters Ins. Co. v. Rhoades, 239 N.Y. 420, 146 N.E. 648
(1925).
113. Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 94 S.W.2d
769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (auto insurance rates).
114. For example, the Mississippi Inspection and Advisory Rating Bureau was
the cause of considerable litigation in that state. At first a suit under the antitrust
statute was dismissed for failure to prove the agreement to fix rates alleged. Miller
ex rel. State v. Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co., 126 Miss. 301, 88 So. 711 (1921).
Then the Bureau was found in violation of the antitrust law over a defense by
the companies that only the insurance commissioner, and not the State Revenue
Agent, could bring suit under the antitrust statute against insurance companies.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883 (1921). Penalties ranging
from $1350 to $195,875 and totaling $8,055,075 were upheld against the 140 foreign
fire insurance companies held guilty of violating the antitrust statute. Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 94 So. 7 (1922), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 698 (1923).
The last Mississippi Supreme Court opinion contains a valuable history of the
South-Eastern Underwriters Association. See 131 Miss. at 390-97, 94 So. at 14-17.
The Robertson cases are discussed in detail in Watkins, The Fire Insurance AntiTrust Suit in Mississippi, 13 VA. L. Rtv. 108 (1926).
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article of "merchandise" within that state's antitrust statute." 5 By
the time of the South-Eastern Underwriters decision in 1944, however,
the tide in the states had shifted. Some twenty or thirty states had
by then enacted some form of rate supervision law, and a number of
the specific insurance anti-compact laws had been repealed. 6
After South-Eastern Underwriters and passage of the McCarranFerguson Act the states undertook to revise and extend their supervision of rate making so as to insure definite exemption of the ratemaking bureaus from the federal antitrust laws. Separate model bills
for (1) fire, marine and inland marine, and (2) casualty and surety
insurance rate making were prepared by a special All-Industry Committee, composed of the various insurance trade associations, in cooperation with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners."' These model bills provided for rate filings by the bureaus
with the insurance supervisory authority in each state. The commissioner was given power to review the filings, to hold hearings and
to order reductions in rates filed. If he failed to act within thirty days
of 'filing, the rates were to be "deemed" to have become effective.
Provision was made for appeal from the commissioner's orders and
for independent filings by non-bureau companies. A "deviation" procedure was also to be established within each rating bureau, and
members' requests for deviations from bureau rates could be pursued
before the commissioner if turned down in the bureau itself. The
standard for the commissioner's review of rates was simply that they
should not be unfair, excessive or discriminatory."' By 1950 every
state, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Puerto Rico had enacted
115. Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).

116. Matthias & Robison, State Regulation of Insurance Rates, 27 Gao. L.J. 1051
(1939). See also Marryott, Mutual Insurance Under Rate Regulation, 15 LAw &
CONThMP. PROB. 540, 544 (1950).
117. The text of the model Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory
Bill (May 18, 1946 draft) appears at 1946 NAIC PROCeeDINGS 410. The text of the
model Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill (May 18, 1946 draft) appears at
1946 NAIC PROCsEDINGs 397. The All-Industry Committee was organized in May,
1945, at a joint meeting of the Federal Legislation Committee of the National
Association of Insurance Companies and industry representatives. The following
insurance trade associations were represented on the Committee: American Institute
of Marine Underwriters, American Life Convention, American Mutual Alliance,
American Reciprocal Association, Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance
Companies, Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, Bureau of Personal
Accident and Health Underwriters, Health and Accident Underwriters Conference,
Inland Marine Underwriters Association, Insurance Executives Association, Life
Insurance Association of America, National Association of Casualty and Surety
Agents, National Association of Independent Insurers, National Association of Insurance Brokers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, National Board of
Fire Underwriters, National Fraternal Congress of America, and the Surety Association of America. 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE 217, n.10 (1952).
118. The provisions of the statutes patterned after the model bills are discussed
and described in detail in Donovan, State Regulation of Insurance, 1956 INs. L.J. 11;
1950 A.B.A. INs. LAW SECT. PROCEEDINGS 334; Bohlinger, supra note 99 at 7-8.
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both fire and casualty rating laws, most separately and some in combination, generally patterned after the model bills prepared by the
All-Industry Committee and the NAIC."n In a few states, notably
California, the rating laws do not require rate filings in advance, and
bureau members are expressly prohibited from agreeing to adhere to
rates fixed by the bureau. Rates are allowed to become effective, with
authority in the commissioner to order a review and substantiation of
rates at any time thereafter.'"0 In a few other states, particularly
2
Texas, the state continues to fix rates directly.' 1
Apparently the enactment of these various types of rating laws
22
led immediately to substantial rate reductions in a number of states.
2. Weaknesses in Current State Regulation of Rates.
Despite these intensive legislative efforts, recently various problems have become apparent which raise considerable question as to
the effectiveness of these statutes, particularly the All-Industry laws,
in securing the best possible insurance coverage for the public at the
lowest possible rates.
a. Vague Statutory Standard.
The rather indefinite statutory standard that rates should not be
unfair, excessive or discriminatory may leave too much discretion in
the administrative authority. Surprisingly, despite the obviously large
number of reviews which insurance commissioners necessarily have
made of rate filings, there has been almost no judicial statement as to
what the specific content of this statutory standard should be. There
are, however, serious indications that politics and various irrational
factors have influenced the making of rates in many cases, resulting
in rates which from a strictly competitive point of view may either
2
have been too high or even, quite often, artificially low.' 1

119. The type of law enacted in each state is noted in 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE
217-21 (1952). The Massachusetts law for Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Insurance and Rating Organizations appears in MASS. GtN. LAWS ANN. ch. 174A,
§§ 1 to 19 (1958), for Casualty Insurance, Including Fidelity, Surety and Guaranty
Bonds and All Other Forms of Motor Vehicle Insurance and Regulation of Rating
Organizations in MASs. GIN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175A, §§ 1-20 (1958). Both of
these laws adhered to the All-Industry model bills.
120. CAL. INS. Coag §§ 1850-1860.3. See also IDAHO COD ANN. §§ 41-200 2018 (1959 Supp.).
121. TEx. INS. CODA ANN. art. 5.25 (1952)..
122. Business Week, May 28, 1949, p. 24, col. 2; June 18, 1949, p. 28, col. 3;
July 2, 1949, p. 54, col. 3. The various types of present rating laws are reviewed
and compared in Matthias & Robison, State Regulation of Insurance Rates, 1952
INs. L.J. 537; Note, The Regulation of Insurance Rates, 47 CoLuM. L. Ruv. 1314

(1947).
123. For a case demonstrating the inexactness of insurance rate filing reviews
under the "model laws", see National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters v. Superin-
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b. Domination by Rating Bureaus.
The rating bureaus appear to play too dominant a role in the
entire rate-making process. This will be made apparent in the consideration of deviations and independent filings below. The bureaus
represent the large majority of fire and casualty insurance companies,
with their membership being drawn mostly from stock companies.
Many mutual companies, direct writing companies and "independents"
are not members. There are some indications in judicial decisions,"'
and it is asserted by some industry observers, 25 that the bureaus'
stranglehold has been weakened in the past few years. However, as
will be seen, the bureaus still exert a very strong influence over rates.
Their lack of tolerance for any independent action is illustrated by
the bill recently passed by the New York State Assembly aimed at
curtailing the highly successful direct writing or mail order automobile insurance business conducted by Allstate Insurance Company.
Bureau members reportedly resent the attractiveness to the public of
lower rates charged by Allstate, which apparently result from a
tougher claims policy and, as will appear below, a lower commission
schedule."2 '
tendent of Ins., 6 App. Div. 2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958), rev'd as moot 6 N.Y.2d
842, 160 N.E.2d 84 (1959). There the Superintendent challenged a filing for
increased auto insurance rates on the grounds that the loss experience covered only 2
instead of 5 years, that the administrative expense loading factor was too high
and that the entire compulsory automobile insurance law system was too new
to justify any increase in rates based on alleged experience to date. The court
reversed the Superintendent because his findings were not based on substantial evidence and indicated that review of rates required specific findings in statistical and
money factor terms by the reviewing authority. As will be demonstrated in the
discussion which follows, the present structure of rate making in property insurance
would hardly appear to support such a standard. On the general problem of the
standards for casualty rate making, see KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCS 573-607 (3d
ed. 1956).
124. For example, bureau rate filings proposing a reduction in basic fire insurance rates and an increase in extended coverage rates have been disapproved, and
the Commissioner's decision upheld. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Rogan, 4 Wis. 2d
558, 91 N.W.2d 372 (1958). See also Cravey v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n,
214 Ga. 450, 105 S.E.2d 497 (1958) where bureau rates were suspended.
125. Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability
of Regulated Competition, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 199, 206 (1958) ; Klitzke, supra note
91, at 638-40.
126. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 6 (city ed.). The strength of the
bureaus and the bureau member companies is not fairly indicated just by their
rate-making activities through the bureaus. The stock fire insurance companies
also derive considerable influence from regional and local underwriters associations which control the sale and distribution of fire insurance. These groups have
traditionally been composed of the agents representing the stock companies and
have employed a number of "rules" to limit competition. Fortune Magazine, The
Underwriters, July 1950, p. 77, at p. 110. For, example, the "in-or-out" rule provides
that an association member cannot represent a company which is represented in the
same locality by a non-member agent. This rule effectively prevents a particular
insurance company from placing or "planting" policies through a non-member agent.
For a description of the operation of this particular rule, see Cline v. Insurance
Exchange of Houston, 154 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 166 S.W.2d
677 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1942). The various restrictive rules of these local under-
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c. Deviations Difficult.
Suggestion that the role of the bureaus has been diminishing has
largely been based on an alleged trend toward a more ready granting
of deviations from bureau rates to bureau members. 127 It is also
claimed, however, that deviations are still made too difficult. 2 ' Despite the fact that the right to file deviations was clearly established
under state rating statutes even prior to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 2 ' there is considerable evidence to support the charge against
the bureaus. Most deviation requests granted by insurance commissioners have been dragged through the courts by bureau members to
the great harassment of companies attempting to provide lower rates. 30
Illustrative of the difficulties is the denial by the courts of an Allstate
Insurance Company deviation request although the bureau concerned
offered no evidence whatever in opposition to Allstate's petition.' 31
d. Independent Filings Fought.
Closely connected with the deviation problem is the ability of
companies not members of bureaus to make "independent filings."
Recently a number of companies, because of difficulty in obtaining
deviations, have withdrawn from the bureaus and have pursued the
independent filing route.' 32 Several recent cases in state courts, particularly in New York, have upheld the rights of independents,'
writers associations are described in Note, Rules of Independent Insurance Agents'
Associations under the Sherman Act, 105 U. PA. L. Rlv. 977 (1957). The rules
apparently will be regarded as collective refusals to deal or boycotts subject to
the Sherman Act by virtue of the section 3(b) proviso of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act specifically reserving federal jurisdiction, without limitation, as to that class of
acts. United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.
1957), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957) ; United States v. Insurance Bd., 144
F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956), 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960); United
States v. Baton Rouge Ins. Exchange, Civil No. 2088, E.D. La., June 27, 1958 (consent decree). A review of Allstate's development and business policies appears in
Business Week, Allstate Insurance: Playing the Field From Now On, July 11,
1959, p. 76.
127. Heins, Recent Developments in Property and Casualty Insurance, 9 J.
AM4R. Soc'Y C.L.U. 343, 354-55 (1955).
128. Brook, All-Industry Rate Regulation v. The Public Interest, 1951 INs. L.J.
183, 186-89; Ely, Governmental Regulation of Insurance Marketing Practices, 1954
INS. L.J. 186, 191-92; Lemmon, Disturbing Indications on the Insurance Horizon,
1957 INs. L.J. 663, 666-68.
129. Utilities Ins. Co. v. State Ins. Bd., 184 Okla. 234, 84 P.2d 619 (1938);
American Druggists Fire Ins. Co. v. State Ins. Bd., 184 Okla. 66, 84 P.2d 614
(1938).
130. E.g., National Capital Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 148 F. Supp. 317 (D.D.C. 1957);
Cook County Inspection Bureau v. Day, 349 111. App. 459, 110 N.E.2d 874 (1953)
State Farm Mut. Auto. Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Rating Comm'n, 79 So. 2d 888
(La. App. 1955).
131. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 434, 100 S.E.2d 31 (1957).
132. Stone, Rate Regulation v. Rate Making, 1955 INs. L.J. 107.
133. Cullen v. Holz, 2 Misc. 2d 486, 152 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1956). This
particular case involved an independent fire insurance dwelling rate filing by Allstate which was ultimately approved with rates 15% below those of the bureau
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even to the extent of their becoming only partial subscribers to bureaus
and then using the bureau rate and statistical material as the basis for
their own independently computed and filed rates."8 4 That the services
of the rating bureau should be available to any insurer was established early by state judicial decision.'
The right of partial subscribership, denial of which the Department of Justice has warned
might be considered a violation of the federal antitrust laws, 8 6 of
course, goes far to break down the rating bureau as a compulsory
unit and to make it more like a statistics gathering-type trade association. Bureau companies have, of course, objected on this very
ground to its use only for certain purposes by what are essentially
independent companies.
e. Unscientific Rate-Making Procedures.
Fire insurance rate making in particular is certainly not a scientific
matter but rather is an exercise in "educated judgment." This leads
one to suspect that freer competition in rates would result if that
"judgment" were not exercised collectively. Apart from the question
of collective decision, the rate-making process itself may be questioned
as harboring many questionable features, features which might be improved under the aegis of genuine competition among companies.
These features can be understood only against a general background understanding of the fire insurance rate-making process. Rates
are of two general types (1) class, minimum or tariff rates used for
types of risk, e.g., private residences, which it is uneconomical to inspect individually, and (2) schedule rates, which are characteristic of
larger industrial risks where inspection is not only feasible but necessary.
Schedule rating, which is by far the more important from the point of
companies. The difference resulted largely from Allstate's lower commission scales.
Allstate's agents receive only 15% first year commission and 6'/% annual renewal
commissions, while the agents of the bureau companies receive 20-25% first year
and annual renewal commissions. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1954, p. 17, col. 3 (late
city ed.).
134. Pacific Fire Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 83 Ariz.
369, 321 P.2d 1030 (1958); Cullen v. Bohlinger, 284 App. Div. 963, 136 N.Y.S.2d
361 (1954), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 886, 126 N.E.2d 564 (1955), appeal dismissed
on motion, 350 U.S. 803 (1955). The Insurance Superintendent's opinion in the
Cullen case appears in 1 N.Y. Ins. Rep. 50a-51a (1955). Both cases involved the
Insurance Company of North America of Philadelphia, which has been very active
in making independent filifigs. For the problems faced by this company in following
an "independent" course see Smith, Current Developments in Insurance Rate Regulation, 1960 INs. L.J. 75.
135. Importers & Exporters Ins. Co. v. Rhoades, 239 N.Y. 420, 146 N.E. 648

(1925).
136. Hansen, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws, Address to the American Ass'n
of University Teachers of Insurance in Chicago, Dec. 29, 1958, at p. 10. Official Dept.
of Justice Mimeo. Press Release.
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view of premium volume, calls for use of an assumed basis rate to which
credits or charges are made for favorable or unfavorable features of
the risk, such as sprinklers, fire escapes, wood construction, etc. Basis
rates have been drawn up for various classes of structures, and the
number of these classes has recently been expanded to 110 from the
previous 26.
The basis rates (and the class rates as well) really comprise
separate elements: (1) losses, (2) expenses, (3) conflagration or
catastrophe losses, and (4) underwriting profit. These various components of the basis rate are determined as follows. The element for
losses is determined by a loss ratio of incurred losses to earned premiums. The necessary loss information is apparently gathered completely separately by different industry associations for the stock companies, the mutual companies and the independents, and the information is normally at least one year old. The second element, expenses,
is determined by means of an expense ratio (normally 40-50 per cent)
which includes charges for commissions to agents (to be considered
in detail below), loss adjustment expenses, taxes, license costs, fees,
etc. The third element, similar to a contingency reserve, is now computed at one per cent of premium. The fourth element has been limited
7
by NAIC rule to five per cent since 1921.11
For several reasons it seems highly doubtful that this rate-making
structure can produce a genuinely accurate and equitable premium rate.
(1) Schedules Not Uniform. The schedules used in the schedule
form of rating, which is the more significant, are by no means uniform
throughout the country, and therefore the loss data derived from them
cannot be correlated. This means that the much greater potential
degree of accuracy in computing the loss ratio element of premium
which would be possible if nation-wide experience could be pooled
is sacrificed. It also means that rates may vary strikingly in different
sections of the country for the identical risk. Illustrative of the difficulties is the fact that the Analytic System (originated in 1901) is
used in some 28 states, mostly in the Midwest and some in New England. On the Eastern seaboard generally the Universal Mercantile
Schedule (originated in 1893) is used. The method of rate computation employed in each of these systems or schedules is completely
different. And various other local areas in the country use yet other
137. The basic material on the rate-making process has been drawn largely
HARDY, THE MAKING OF THE FIRE INSURANCE RATE (1926); MOWBRAY &
BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 353 (4th ed. 1955); 2 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 351-55 (1958); Klitzke, Fire

from

Insurance Rates and the Law, 1956 INS. L.J. 631, 640-42.
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types of schedules.'
Although it is claimed by some observers that
fire insurance rate-making processes have been improving in recent
years," 9 both industry representatives and state insurance commissioners have vigorously and frankly attacked the overlapping and
contradictory schedule systems as completely precluding application
of scientific methods of premium computation to fire insurance. 40
This criticism would appear to be quite justified.
(2) Underwriting Profit Excluded. Although the problem has
recently come in again for searching examination by both the NAIC
and various individual states, it is still practice in fire rate making to
compute rates solely on the basis of underwriting profit. Investment
income is not included, whether from investments of required reserves, capital gains, or simply the interest on surplus.' 4' Prior to
the general enactment of the All-Industry model rating bills after
1945, courts in the various states had split over this question.'4 2 It
seems highly, questionable whether the current practice should be continued. Apparently the underlying theory is that a fire insurance company acts like two separate businesses - with the policyholders being
dealt with from the underwriting side and the investment income
138. HtUBNtR & BLACK, PROPERTY INSURANCE 187-204 (4th ed. 1957); Klitzke,
supra note 137, at 640-42. The difference in rate-making methods, simply between
the two major schedule systems, is striking. The Analytic System divides cities
and towns into 10 groups according to the type of fire protection services available.
Then within each city three classes of buildings are set up according to type of
construction. Master tables are made up for each combination of these two categories, and these tables provide the "basis rate." Percentage credits and charges for
favorable and unfavorable features are then added or subtracted. The Universal
Mercantile Schedule, on the other hand, assumes a standard building in a standard
city and fixes a basis rate for it of, say, 254 per $100 of insurance coverage. Selection
of this basis rate is really arbitrary. "Key rates" are then determined for a particular city by adjustments to this basis rate. For a particular risk, monetary (rather
than percentage) credits and charges are applied for features of the building, such
as occupational use and fire protection. HXUBNUR & BLACK, op. cit. supra at 190-91.
139. 2 WHTNUY, op. cit. supra note 137, at 351-52.
140. National Underwriter, Nov. 28, 1957, p. 13, col. 1, reporting address by
Mr. Ambrose B. Kelley, General Counsel, Factory Mutuals, to the Casualty Actuarial Society of Philadelphia; PINK, THU PROBLEPM or FIRE RATES 13-14 (1942)
(the author was then Superintendent of Insurance of New York).
141. The insurance industry is not, however, entirely in agreement on this
matter. See Kulp, The Rate-Making Process In Property and Casualty Insurance Goals, Technics and Limits, 15 LAW & CONvtMP. PROB. 493, 517 (1950); N.Y.
Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation, Leg. Doc. No. 56,
pp. 24-25 (1955).
142. Investment income should not be included for rate-making purposes:
Bullion v. Aetna Ins. Co., '151 Ark. 519, 237 S.W. 716 (1922). It should be so
included, but only to the extent of income on investments of unearned premiums:
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 34 F.2d 185 (W.D. Mo. 1929), aff'd sub nom. National
Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331 (1930); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 285 S.W.
65 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1926). It should be so included to the full extent of income
earned on investments of capital, surplus and unearned premiums: Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Travis, 121 Kan. 802, 257 Pac. 337 (1926), af'd on rehearing, 124 Kan. 350,
259 Pac. 1068 (1927), cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Baker, 276 U.S.
628 (1928).
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being reserved, at least in the stock companies, for the stockholders.' 4
It would seem that an insurance business is an insurance business
and nothing more. Therefore, it would be much more appropriate to
44
include investment income in the rate base.
(3) Commissions Uncontrolled. It is still highly uncertain
whether the agents' commission component of the fire insurance rate
is subject to any form of state control. As pointed out above, this
element comprises a substantial part of the total first year premium.
If it is not subject to state control, it certainly should be. Courts over
the years have been divided on whether the common law of restraint
of trade or antitrust or anti-compact statutes would reach intercompany agreements fixing agents' commissions.' 4 5 Likewise, courts
have divided over the question of whether the commissioners' regulatory power over the ultimate rates themselves extended to the commission component of those rates. 4 The net result was that for years,
until the McCarran-Ferguson Act, companies collectively agreed
upon commissions through the Acquisition Cost Conference device. Supposedly such arrangements have been abandoned since
1945.117 This does not appear to be the case. A Mississippi court as
recently as 1957 had to invalidate a fantastic device for the fixing of
agents' commissions under that state's rating statute. 4 And a suit
under the Sherman Act filed by an agents' association in California
alleging a commission fixing conspiracy by the auto casualty insurance
143. That the companies do take this two-part view of their business, see
Fortune Magazine, supra note 126, at 78.
144. For a detailed explanation of this view, see Comment, The Rate Regulation
of Fire Insurance Companies, 42 YALz L.J. 107, 110 (1932).
145. E.g., agreements upheld: Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W.
397 (1893) (under common law and antitrust statute); agreements overthrown:
Potomac Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (under
anti-compact statute).
146. Holding that power does exist: O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931). Holding that power does not exist: Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 359, 43 N.E.2d 442 (1942); Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Board of Ins. Comm'rs, 34 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
147. Butler, Activities of Agents Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAW & CONTIMP.
PROB. 568, 571-72 (1950). The Acquisition Cost Conferences were condemned under
the New York state antitrust law in 1949. N.Y. ATr'y G9N. ANN. Rzp. 140 (1949).
And commission agreements were attacked by the Ohio Insurance Superintendent in
1948. Journal of Commerce, Jan. 6, 1948, p. 14, col. 1.
148. Miss. CoDE § 5825 (1942) (law since 1924) provided that the Insurance
Commissioner should each year obtain written opinions from every stock fire
insurance company doing business in the state as to the amount of commissions the
companies should pay their local agents. The Commissioner would then advise the
rating bureau as to the majority opinion, which in turn should fix the commission
rate. On protest by the Allstate Insurance Company, which had already obtained
approval of a 15% overall rate deviation from the Commissioner and wished to
absorb the saving by cutting first year agents' commissions from the bureau "majority"
rate of 25% to 15%, the statute was voided as an unconstitutional delegation of
state authority to a private group. State v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869, 97 So.
2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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companies in that state is now pending. 149 Such a commission fixing
agreement would apparently be a per se violation of the Sherman Act
under existing authority. 50 And since, as indicated above, a number
of states regard the control of commissions as lying outside the power

of state regulatory authorities, the section 2(b) proviso of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act should be no barrier to application of the
federal antitrust statutes.
(4) Agreements on More than "Pure Premium." The problem
of commissions raises another even more fundamental issue with regard to the two elements of the basic fire insurance premium other than

the loss ratio element. Even admitting the argument of the companies
that the expense and difficulty of compiling accurate loss experience
requires some cooperative action with regard to rates, it is indefensible
that this cooperative action should extend to those elements of the
rate-making process which lie within the control of each company
individually. It has been said accurately that insurance companies can
truly compete only in three ways - price, product (the policy) and
service. 5 ' As will be seen below, genuine differences in "product" or
policy formats or coverages have been inhibited both by state law and
by the rating bureaus' actions. If this is true, then the present practice of agreeing on expense and profit ratios removes the only remaining possible element of competition from the fire insurance business. It seems elementary that rate fixing, if permitted at all, should
be limited to the "pure" or loss-experience premium. 52
f. New Coverages Impeded.
Closely associated with the problem of rates, but nevertheless
distinct, is the problem of variations in policy forms and coverages.
Every state has a standard fire policy law which set forth specific
53
clauses which must be included in every fire insurance policy.'

Considerable variation in indorsements is, however, possible.' 4 But
these laws, when taken together with the rigidity produced by
separate bureaus under the overall direction of different industry
associations fixing rates for the several branches of insurance, have
149. See note 4 supra.
150. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
151. Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 125, at 205.
152. Berge, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws, 1946 A.B.A. INs. L. SecT.
160, 167 (1951). See also AVr'Y GFN. NAT'L

PROCUEDINGS 29, 33; Note, 60 YALg L.J.
COMM. ANTITRUST RiP. 290-91 (1955).
153. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 168.

154. Patterson, Insurance Law During the War Years, 46 COLUM. L. Riv. 345,
See also PATTeRSON, ESSZNTIALS OV INSURANCt LAW 35 (2d ed.

346-48 (1946).
1957).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6: p. 281-

made very difficult the development of new forms of insurance marketing to meet modern public needs. It has apparently been difficult
enough for imaginative companies to secure final approval of newtype policy forms, such as installment policies payable at a discount,
which are basic in this consumer credit era. 5 ' But the much more
serious problem arises in connection with the recent development of
so-called "multiple coverage" policies which are the product of the
"multiple line" or "fleet" companies.'
These policies, typified by
the "Homeowners Comprehensive" policy which combines fire, liability, and other coverages for the home,' 57 necessarily cross the tradi155. For example, the Insurance Company of North America devised an "Instalment Premium Plan" under which the premium for a three year fire policy could be.
paid in three annual instalments, with the first year's premium to be a full year
premium but the subsequent premiums to be only 78% of a full year premium. The
INA plan would actually have cost -more than the conventional bureau-type instalment plans for three year policies, which charged only 75% of a full year's premium,
for each year after the first. But the INA plan also offered an "automatic reinstatement clause" with renewed full coverage after any loss, which was contrary to,
the bureau practice. This INA plan, or some variation of it, was upheld in Arkansas
Inspection & Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 218 Ark. 830, 238
S.W.2d 929 (1951), but invalidated in Virginia Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 47 S.E.2d 401 (1948). Approval of the plan also ran into.
procedural difficulties in Mississippi Ins. Comm'n v. Insurance Co. of No. America,
203 Miss. 533, 36 So. 2d 165 (1948), and in Insurance Co. of No. America v. Commissioner of Ins., 327 Mass. 745, 101 N.E. 2d 335 (1951). This last case held that
the statutory "deviation" procedure could not be pursued for approval of the instalment plan because the deviation procedure was designed only for actual rate
schedule matters. Contra, Department of Ins. v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 222
Ind. 611, 57 N.E.2d 62 (1944); General Ins. Co. of America v. Bowen, 130 Ohio,
St. 82, 196 N.E.774 (1935).
156. "Multiple line" companies are those which write insurance in more than
one of the three traditional classes, e.g., writing both fire and casualty. "Fleet companies" are the result of the so-called "Appleton Rule" in New York, which arose
about 1900 and which divided insurance writing into the three basic classes of life, fire
and marine, and casualty and surety and specified further limits on the types of
insurance within each of these principal classes which any one company could write.
However, the law also allowed 35% of the excess surplus funds of a property insurer to be invested in another insurer. This led to the creation of "fleet" companies,
each one ultimately controlled by the same parent and each one writing a different line
of insurance. See generally, Winter, Multiple Line Insurance Underwriting, The
Company Viewpoint, American Management Ass'n, Ins. Series No. 71, p. 16 (1947).
These subsidiary companies are known in the industry as "pups." The "fleet" or
"pup" companies apparently also were a response to avoid rules adopted by the
local underwriters associations forbidding any association member from taking the
agency of any company which already had an agent in a particular city. See
Fortune Magazine, supra note 126, at 110. Such rules were held not to constitute
common law restraints of trade. E.g., Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters v. Johnson,
133 Ky. 797, 119 S.W. 153 (1909). The local underwriters associations (which are
briefly described in note 126 supra) also secured state statutes which limited each
insurance company to one agent in a particular town or one agent in a city of 50,000
or less and two agents in larger cities. Such statutes were held unconstitutional as
contrary to the due process clauses of both federal and state constitutions. Franklin
Fire Ins. v. Montoya, 32 N.M. 88, 251 Pac. 390 (1926) (statute limiting each company
to one agent per city); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 130 Wash. 490,
228 Pac. 516 (1924) (statute limiting each company to one agent in cities of 50,000
or less and two agents in larger cities).
157. The "Homeowner's" policy, a recent development combines fire, extended
coverage and burglary protection on real and personal property, together with personal liability insurance. This "package," through spreading the risk, greater selectivity, more coverage per dollar insured and reduced accounting costs, has pro-
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tional three divisions of insurance - life, fire and marine, and casualty
and surety. These policies have been made possible at all only by
passage in recent years of special "multiple line" statutes permitting
companies to write all lines of insurance other than life in a single
corporate organization, provided certain minimum capital and surplus requirements are met.158 However, all the problems have not been
solved. The state insurance commissioners are frank to admit that
development of these combination policies, with their consequent cost
savings to the public, has been delayed because the different branches
of the industry cannot coordinate the filings of their various bureaus
with regard to them.15 9 These new "multiple line" and "combination
policy" developments may well necessitate a complete overhauling of
the insurance rate-making structure because of consumer demand.
g. Inadequate State Staffs.
Underlying all of the particular problems discussed above is the
more basic difficulty that the large majority of state insurance departments simply do not have the budget, facilities or qualified staff with
which properly to review rates submitted to them or to undertake
the research necessary to improve the present rate-making process.
The functions of the insurance commissioners are extremely
comprehensive. They must issue and revoke licenses for insurance
companies; license agents and brokers; review company submissions
of new policy forms and endorsements; audit companies; supervise
underwriting limitations, investment controls and management practices; oversee company withdrawals, rehabilitations and liquidations;
and, in some cases, act as state fire marshal. 6 0 These functions must
duced a policy with a premium 20% cheaper than the total premiums for each of
these coverages purchased separately. 2 WHITNtY, op. cit. supra note 137, at 365.
"Extended coverage" is simply a package indorsement attached to a standard fire
insurance policy, without any increase in the face value of the policy, to cover other
risks such as windstorm, hail, explosion, riot attending strike, civil commotion, falling
aircraft, and vehicle and smoke damage. MAcgt, PROPtRTY INSURANcg 215 (3d ed,
1955).
158. Such laws were given impetus by the NAIC in 1943. By 1947 some 33
states, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and the Virgin Islands had passed statutes
granting multiple line powers. For a specimen law, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.05
(Supp. 1961). For an analysis of the impact of these laws see Heins, Multiple Line
Underwriting and Wisconsin Insurance Laws, 1957 Wis. L.-lRv. 563.
159. 2 1958 NAIC PROCXPDINGS 404; Dineen, The Rating Problem, 1945 A.B.A.
INs. LAW StCT. PROCXVDINGs 104, 113 (the author was then Superintendent of Insur-

ance of New York). See the discussion of bureau organization, note 91 supra.
160. Detailed descriptions of the duties and functions of the insurance commis-

sioners in three typical states appear in Faircloth, The Functions and Duties of the
Florida Insurance Commissioner, 1953 INS. L.J. 379; Russell, The State Insurance
Department, 7 OKLA. L. Rgv. 142 (1954); and Note, Administrative Control of Insurance in Kentucky, 27 Ky. L.J. 462 (1939). The most comprehensive general
study on this subject ever published is PATgr RSON, THri INSURANCt COMMISSIONER IN
THE UNITED STATES

(1927), which unfortunately is now considerably outdated.
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be performed in Utah, for example, with a total staff of nine persons
and a budget in 1956 of only $33,274.51. Only four members of that
staff perform other than clerical functions, and the staff does not
include a trained actuary. Yet, in addition to reviewing an average of
twenty new policy forms per day, that staff is expected to make an
effective review of premium rate filings.""' A recent study of this particular state department concluded that the ".

.

. smallness of staff

forces him [the commissioner] to rely heavily on the rating bureaus."' 6 2
It further found that the department generally accepts the filed bureau
rates without question and uses them to analyze the rates of nonbureau companies. If the non-bureau rates are "in line" with the
bureau rates, they are approved without question. However, substantiation will be required where there is more than a 10 or 15 per
63
cent deviation from the bureau rates.1
These problems of inadequate staff and inadequate supervision
are not confined to the smaller states. Even New York state, which
is generally regarded as the pacesetter and the strictest state in regulating insurance, has recently displayed its inability to cope with
the problems of aviation insurance. During the recent Senate subcommittee hearings on aviation underwriting, evidence was disclosed
that the few underwriting syndicates in this field have been agreeing
on rates for large hull risks1 4 and engaging in "coordinated" bidding
for airport concessions for the sale of airline trip insurance. 65 It appears
that from the beginning all states other than New York have done
nothing toward regulating or examining aviation underwriting but
have left its supervision entirely up to New York insurance authori161. Kimball & Hansen, The Utah Insurance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in Action, Part I,5 UTAH L. Rtv. 429, 432-34 (1957). On the
problem of inadequate staffing, see Vorys, Insurance Supervision and Current Trends,
26 INS. COUNSEL J. 43 (1959).
162. Kimball & Hansen, supra note 161, at 448.
163. Ibid.
164. Reinsurance with several hundred companies is apparently considered essential for such large hull risks as the Boeing 707 commercial jet airliner, for which
the prototype required $6.5 million insurance coverage. Apparently the American
syndicates are agreeing on rates with their British counterparts who have been
brought in because of the large size of these risks. Journal of Commerce, Aug. 7,

1958, p. 2, col. 1.

165. Apparently this action has been undertaken in an attempt to exclude
certain regular accident and health insurance companies which also write in this
field. For example, the two remaining large American aviation underwriting syndiates, Associated Aviation Underwriters and United States Aviation Underwriters,
reputedly make "alternate" low bids for airport concessions. And Associated
Aviation Underwriters is reported to have joined with Continental Casualty Company's Airport Sales Corporation in selling each other's policies over the counter
by reciprocal agreement so as to provide $250,000 maximum coverage per passenger
as against the $125,000 available from Tele-Trip, the subsidiary of Mutual of
Omaha. Journal of Commerce, Aug. 15, 1958, p. 3, col. 4; Eastern Underwriter,
Aug. 15, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
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ties. 166 At the recent hearings representatives of that department confessed unfamiliarity with many of the restrictive industry practices
67
disclosed.
B. Tie-In Sales.
Here historical background is unnecessary. It is enough to state
that tie-in sales of insurance with either loans or other types of insurance have become increasingly common in recent years and that both
state and federal authorities have been receiving a growing number
68
of complaints concerning such tie-ins.1
The different types of tie-ins involving insurance which have
come to light will be examined below. But first the means by which
this problem can be, and generally has been, attacked under state
law should be noted. Direct supervision or approval, as in the case of
rate making, is unknown. Apparently every state has enacted at least
one or more statutes to deal with problems of unlawful inducements,
discrimination and rebates." 9 These statutes, of course, vary in their
terms, but those of Massachusetts may be examined for illustrative
purposes. That state appears to have three applicable statutory provisions, all phrased in prohibitory terms. First, insurance company
representatives are forbidden to give any inducement, consideration
or rebate not specified in the policy or contract ;i70 second, lenders are
prohibited from lending on condition that insurance be placed in a
particular manner ;""1 and third, life insurance representatives are forbidden to give any inducement for sale of a policy in the form of
72
stocks, securities or dividends or profits on stocks or securities.
Only.the second of these statutes provides a specific penalty - a $100
fine per violation. Administratively, Massachusetts does seem to have
expressed a general policy against tie-ins 18 and, in the insurance field
in particular, it seems from the authorities that they would definitely
166. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, A STUDY or AVIATION INSURANCE 5, 38
(1944).
167. This was brought out before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee's hearings in August 1958, when the representatives of the New York
Insurance Department testified that they had not heard about certain of the practices
being employed by the aviation underwriters until they were disclosed at the Congressional hearing. Eastern Underwriter, Aug. 22, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
168. N.Y. Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation, Leg.
Doc. No. 31, pp. 38-39 (1951); 2 WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 137, at 376.
169. VANCE, INSURANCE 50 (3d ed. 1951).
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 182 (1958).
171. Id. at § 193E.
172. Id. at § 121.
173. 6 MASS. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 483, 485-86 (1922).
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be condemned. 4 Occasionally, insurance tie-ins have been attacked
under state antitrust statutes but, as will be seen below, without much
success.
If the country is considered as a whole, how effectively have tie-ins
been controlled under state law? The answer is brief. Control has
been highly erratic.
1. Property Insurance.
First, mortgagees frequently require that loans on real estate be
conditioned on placing hazard insurance on the property with a particular insurance company or agency to be designated by the mortgagee.
The few state cases which apparently have considered this problem
have generally held that the practice was not a violation, either of
state antitrust statutes or of state anti-inducement or antirebate statutes. 17 Second, in recent years large mortgage lenders
have begun to refuse to accept property insurance placed with
mutual insurance companies. 7 6 There appear to be no cases in
state courts concerning this practice. Third, apparently because
the state insurance superintendent refused over the last several
years to recognize their requests for automobile insurance premium
increases, casualty insurers doing business in New York have been
waging a tie-in "war of nerves" on their policyholders. The com174. For example, it has been held a violation of MAss. G4N. LAWS ANN. ch.
175, § 182 (1958) for an insurance broker to grant a release from a contract
authorizing him to sell stock for a commission in exchange for the sale of a life
insurance policy on the life of the president of the other contracting party. Parrott
v. G. H. Mansfield & Co., 266 Mass. 121, 165 N.E. 25 (1929). Also, in finding
that the issuance of group life insurance to cover any remaining instalment payments
at the death of purchasers under a ten year accumulative investment program was
not a violation of MASS. GPN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 121 (1958) because the investment and life insurance companies were completely separate, the Massachusetts Attorney General stated: "There would, however, be a violation of this section if the
life insurance company were identical with the vendor under the investment program,
or if the insurance company benefited by or had any connection, direct or indirect,
or any officer, agent, or broker of the insurance company had any such connection,
direct or indirect, with the sale under this investment program." MASS. A'r'y GSN.
ANN. Rip. 55 (1954).
175. Holding no violation of a state antitrust statute: Feldman v. Costa, 171
S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). Holding no violation of a state anti-inducement
or anti-rebate statute: Calvin Phillips & Co. v. Fishback, 84 Wash. 124, 146 Pac.
181 (1915). In this latter case the insurance agent was granted additional compensation in the form of an exclusive right to write all fire insurance on the mortgaged
property during the term of the mortgages. The court held this tie-in not offensive
to the statute on the ground that the aim of the statute was only to insure a flat and
uniform premium for all insureds. A similar tie-in was later held a violation of the
statute in Moser v. Pantages, 96 Wash. 65, 164 Pac. 768 (1917), which distinguished
Fishback on the ground that that case, unlike the Moser case, had not involved a
rebate of commissions, either on the loan or on the insurance policy. This distinction, which seems unjustifiably artificial, has apparently since been maintained. See
Wolfe v. Philippine Inv. Co., 175 Wash. 165, 27 P.2d 132 (1933).
176. Hansen, Important Questions of the Day (Antitrust), Address

to the

National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, Oct. 15, 1957, p. 11. Official Dept.
of Justice Mimeo. Release.
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panies have not only conditioned writing of new automobile insurance
policies on applicants' taking out other forms of property insurance,
for instance residential or home insurance, as they did in 1953,'7'
but also have even refused to renew policies of existing automobile
insurance policyholders unless those existing policyholders now take
out other forms of property insurance with that same company. 7
Currently, no legal steps appear to have been taken against this form
of tie-in.
2. Life Insurance.
First, some life insurance companies grant loans, particularly
for residential mortgages, only if the borrower at the same time takes
out a life insurance policy on his life with the particular insurance
company. Earlier state cases apparently split on whether such "tie-ins"
The
should be condemned under the state anti-inducement statutes.'
cases which found the statutes not violated by this practice apparently
turned on the narrow construction, which often seemed unwarranted,
that the statutes concerned were directed at the sale of life insurance on
condition that a loan be taken rather than on the converse situation. 8 ° The most recent case arose in Ohio in 1957 and involved
the Equitable Life Assurance Society's "Assured Home Ownership"
plan, which required use of either an existing or a new Equitable
policy to cover the remaining balance of the mortgage loan. Apparently Equitable now makes no other form of residential mortgage
loan. The court found this plan not in violation of the Ohio antiinducement statute.' 8 ' But the decision raised such opposition that
177. In 1953 the Department of Justice and the FBI conducted a six months' investigation into this type of practice. Apparently there were insufficient grounds on
which to base either a civil or criminal federal antitrust suit. Journal of Commerce,
Feb. 17, 1953, p. 11, col. 1.
178. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1959, p. 1, s. 1, col. 4 (city ed.). See also the editorial in
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1959, p. 32, col. 2 (city ed.). The company action was apparently based upon the refusal by the Superintendent of Insurance to approve rate
filings by the casualty bureaus for auto insurance rate increases of 40% for passenger
cars and 17% for commercial vehicles. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1959, p. 26, col. 7 (city
ed.). The upshot of the entire matter was approval by the Superintendent of rate
increases for passenger cars averaging 18.4% and a stern warning from the Superintendent that the department would take firm action if the insurers did not end the
"gray market." The new rates applied to the 178 stock casualty companies represented
by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the thirty-five companies
affiliated with the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, which together wrote some 80%
of the auto insurance business in New York state. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1959, p. 1,
col. 5 (city ed.).
179. Finding a violation: Western Union Life Ins. Co. v. Musgrave, 25 Ariz.
219, 215 Pac. 536 (1923) ; Mechling v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 53 Pa. Super. 526
(1913); Reed v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 50 Pa. Super. 384 (1912). Finding no
violation: Key v. National Life Ins. Co., 107 Iowa 446, 78 N.W. 68 (1899).
180. E.g., Key v. National Life Ins. Co., supra note 179.
181. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Robinson, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 18, 147 N.E.2d
648 (C.P. 1957). The court claimed that there were no reported decisions on the
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a bill was introduced into the Ohio legislature which would in
effect have reversed the decision and clearly applied the antiinducement statute to this type of case.'8 2 Surprisingly, a Massachusetts Attorney General's opinion in 1919 approved this same
Equitable plan on the ground that "the investment of the money paid
to insurance companies by policyholders is not foreign to insurance;
in fact, it is a part of the business of the companies. In effect, it is
simply preferring the policyholders in the investment of the companies'
funds."' 8 3 This language would appear to be a confession of the very
tie-in device which the statute should condemn.
Second, life insurance policies have been issued which designate
an exclusive undertaker to whom the proceeds should be paid so that
the family of the deceased is prevented from selecting an undertaker
independently. These arrangements have been condemned under a state
constitutional provision against monopoly and a state anti-rebate
statute, 8 4 and under a state statute specifically designed to outlaw
them.18 5 But they also have been upheld in the face of statutes of the
latter type and as not being common law restraints of trade.'
Third, and perhaps most serious in the life insurance field, are
general credit life insurance tie-ins.' 87 Many state cases appear to
questions raised and relied for authority principally upon an unreported case from
West Virginia, Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Critchton, Hon. Julian F. Bouchelle, Cir.
Ct., Kanawha County, W. Va., Sept. 20, 1951. See 147 N.E.2d at 655. The Ohio court
also construed the anti-inducement statute as applying to insurance made conditional
on taking out a loan but not the converse. See note 180 supra and accompanying
text.
182. The pertinent part of the Ohio anti-inducement statute then read as follows: ".

.

. nor shall such company or person give or offer to give, or enter into

any separate agreement promising to secure, as an inducement or consideration for
insurance, the loan of any money, either directly or indirectly, or any contract for
services." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3911.20 (Page 1953). Sen. Bill. No. 64, filed
Jan. 21, 1959, which was enacted into law effective on Aug. 11, 1959 added the
following language: "nor as a condition of a loan that the applicant, directly or
indirectly, acquire any policy of life or accident and health insurance." OHIO Rv.
CODE ANN. § 3911.20 (Page 1953) (1960 Supp.).
183. 5 MAss. Ops. ATr'y GEN. 391, 392 (1919)

(interpreting MASS.

GEN. LAWS

ch. 175, § 182 (1958).
184. Blackmon v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 179 Ga. 343, 175 S.E. 798 (1934).
185. Robbins v. Hennessey, 86 Ohio St. 181, 99 N.E. 319 (1912).
186. The Kentucky statutes were twice held unconstitutional, apparently on the
ground that the guarantee by the particular burial associations of a burial was
all that differentiated them from ordinary industrial life insurance companies.
Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233, 200
S.W.2d 120 (1946) ; Goodpaster v. Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n, 279
Ky. 92, 129 S.W.2d 1033 (1939).
187. Tie-in sales of life and accident and health insurance with small loans
were the subject of hearings in Kansas and North Carolina in 1954 and Alabama in
1957 by the special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary headed by
Senator Langer. An interim report filed after the first series of hearings urged further investigation into the trade association relations between the companies engaged
in the credit life business, the formation of life insurance subsidiaries by finance and
lending institutions, and coercion and intimidation of borrowers into taking out unwanted credit life insurance. SuncoM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY LEGISLATION,
ANN.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE TIE-IN SALE OF CREDIT
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conclude that insurance may be required as a condition of a loan,
even from the particular insurance company making the loan, so
long as the insurance is not just a sham to secure a higher rate of
interst which would then become usurious under the particular state
statute controlling interest rates.'
A number of state cases have,
however, described such arrangements as "tie-ins" and at least by
way of dictum condemned them if the insurance was required to be
taken out either with the lender itself or a particular named insurance company.' 8 9 However, this condemnation was again based upon
usury statutes rather than upon state anti-inducement or antitrust laws.
In Massachusetts, credit life insurance tie-ins have been ruled in
violation of that state's anti-inducement statute. 9 This entire problem may have resolved itself somewhat recently by virtue of the new
federal income tax provisions for life insurance companies. Changes
in the formula of taxation may have made investment in life insurance
company subsidiaries much less attractive for finance companies.' 9 '
INSURANCE

IN

CONNECTION

WITH

SMALL

LOANS AND

OTHER

TRANSACTIONS

12

(Comm. Print 1955). Credit life insurance, which has grown enormously with the
post-war increase in consumer credit transactions, has been the subject of many abuses,
such as pyramiding (overlapping coverages), non-payment of claims, excessive insurance coverage in proportion to the loan and exorbitant rates. The abuses and the
actions proposed by the NAIC and others to eliminate them are summarized in KEDZIE,
CONSUMER CREDIT INSURANCE 133-57 (1957). See also Hill, Life Insurance and Consumer Instalment Credit, 13 Ass'N or LIpE INS. COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS 525 (1957) for
an analysis of the present state laws.

188. The cases are fully presented and analyzed in Van Slyck, Insurance Security
for Loans - Historical Development of Court-Made Law, 23 J. KAN. B. Ass'N.
239 (1955).
189. E.g., Tribble v. State, 89 Ga. App. 593, 596-97, 80 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1954)
(dictum); Rodriguez v. R.P. Youngberg Finance, Ltd., 241 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951) (dictum).
190. 5 MASS. OPs. ATr'Y GEN. 344 (1920) (construing what is now MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 121 (1958)).
191. The unusual advantages under the pre-1959 federal income tax law for
finance companies organizing stock life insurance subsidiaries were not generally
realized. The finance company will naturally charge borrowers as high a premium

for credit life insurance as the traffic will bear and state law will permit. The
premium charges paid over by the finance company to its life insurance subsidiary
were non-taxable underwriting income to the latter because, under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 801-818, the latter company was taxed purely on a net investment income

basis at roughly a 7.8% effective rate. By keeping its underwriting (premium)
income as high as possible and its investment income as low as possible (within the
limits imposed by state insurance laws on required reserves) the insurance subsidiary could minimize its federal income tax burden. The subsidiary would then
strive for maximum dividend payout to its finance company parent so that the latter
could make maximum use of the 85% corporate dividends received credit authorized
by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a). This credit is apparently available for life
insurance corporate dividends on stock even though a similar credit cannot be
taken under the individual dividends received credit of INT. Rlv. CODE oV 1954, § 34.
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, P.L. 86-89, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 73 Stat. 112, provided for the inclusion of at least part of premium or underwriting income in a complex tax formula. That the new tax formula would put
a crimp in credit life subsidiary operations of finance companies was anticipated.
See the statement by Edmund L. Grimes, chairman of Commercial Credit Company,
the nation's second largest independent finance company, reported in N.Y. Times,

Feb. 18, 1959, p. 45, col. 7 (city ed.).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961

51

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 1
[VOL. 6: p. 281
LAW REVIEW

VILLANOVA

C. What Solution Under Existing Law?
1. For Rate Making?
For the specific reasons detailed above, there is serious question
whether the present rate-making system under state supervision and
free from the antitrust laws in fire and casualty insurance is producing
ultimate rates which are truly competitive and the lowest with which
the public could be provided. Evidence also indicates that the public
may not be receiving the best possible product in keeping with modern
demands.
The situation is increasingly serious. Apparently reluctance of the
state commissioners to approve rate increases has even forced some
foreign insurance companies to withdraw from business in the United
States; some bureau members are unhappy and claim that deviations
are too difficult; the independents claim that independent filings are
1 92
also made too difficult.
Defense of the present bureau rate-making system under state
approval is based on the ground that insurance is different from other
products because its sale does not end the obligation of the insurer.
It is said that the uncertainty of the risks involved makes it impossible
to measure the premium needed with any degree of accuracy, that the
required statistical work is too expensive for any one company to
perform alone, that a large central staff with expert experience is required, and that failure of an insurance company because its rates
have been set too low would have intolerably unfavorable social con193
sequences.
These are the same arguments which were made in opposition
to the anti-compact laws enacted by the states just prior to the turn
of the century.'
The little statistical evidence available concerning
the effect of anti-compact laws does suggest that fire insurance rates
were actually much higher in those states which strictly enforced their
anti-compact laws than in those states with no such laws or with lenient
enforcement of statutes of this character. The reason assigned to
192. For example, one British insurance company which wrote slightly more than
$12,000,000 net premiums on fire and automobile business in the United States in
1957 decided to withdraw for this reason. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1958, p. 27, col. 3
(city ed.). See also Ely, Governmental Regulation of Insurance Marketing Practices,
1954 INS. L.J. 186, 191-92.
193. Marryott, Why Regulate Insurance Rates?, 1946 A.B.A. INs. LAW SXcr.
PROCEEDINGS 305, 308-310; Comment, The .Rate Regulation of Fire Insurance Companies, 42 YALE L.J. 107, 108 (1932).
194. Brochure, Fire Insurance Anti-Compact Legislation 23-24 (1907); Johnson,
The Anti-Compact Law, a paper read at the Conference of Tennessee Business Men
at Nashville, Tenn., Jan. 30, 1909. Both documents are on file at the Insurance
Library Association of Boston.
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this somewhat surprising result was that rates could not be reduced
in anti-compact states because companies were unable to combine there
in order to act together to take into account more favorable experience.

19 5

A number of possible separate solutions to the rating problem
under existing law have been advanced. No one of these standing alone
would seem to accomplish the desired result.
a. More Evidence in Rate Filings?
The bureaus themselves have suggested that the difficulty is that
too many states have failed to require adequate evidence in support
.of rate filings. The position taken is worth quoting.
Properly enforced it would tend to reduce to manageable
size the number and variety of new filings and would exert
pressures tending to center responsibility in the technically wellqualified licensed rating organization and in those companies that
are willing to pay the contemplated price, in terms of maintenance
of adequate supporting information, for being outside the bureau
system.'9 6
The bureau solution obviously is "conformity to bureau rates" and
would not be acceptable.
b. The California-type Law?
Much support has been given to the California-type law which,
as discussed above, does not require any filings in advance. However,
the state can call for filings and supporting data for approval at any
time. Obviously this system avoids the problem of submission of stale
statistical experience with rate filings, frees the departments of a
rate-fixing responsibility which they cannot really thoroughly perform
anyway, avoids the threat to the solvency of small companies through
195. For example, the average stock fire insurance rate for the United States
for the 19 years from 1880-1898 inclusive was reported as $1.04 per $100. Apparently
no anti-compact state had a rate lower than this average. Ohio was the nearest
to the average with $1.10. New Hampshire had $1.23. The other anti-compact
states had rates ranging from $1.24 to $2.34, with the average for all 16 anti-compact
states being $1.52. Monthly Journal of Insurance Economics, Feb. 1900, pp. 101-02,
Apr. 1902, pp. 179-81.
196. Marryott, Twelve Years of Insurance As Commerce - Prospects for the
Future, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 191, 196 (1957) (emphasis added.) This view would
also appear to have been adopted in states like Kentucky where bills were filed
with the support of the Insurance Commissioner which would require the Commissioner to adopt uniform property insurance rates and authorize him to adopt uniform
forms for any type of insurance, to prevent the use of rate schedules or bureau plans
by any non-member or mere subscriber and to prevent rate filings on forms prepared
*by another insurer. National Underwriter (Fire & Cas. ed.), Mar. 21, 1958, p. 2,
,col. 3.
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narrow interpretation of the statutory standard "excessive," and insures competition to the public because there will be no tendency to
use the bureau advance filing as the standard for all other insurers." 7
The points seem convincing. But the bureaus would still be free to
agree collectively on rates for the bureau companies, and the accuracy
of statistical loss experience would not be improved.
c. Better State Administration?
It has also been suggested that the present state laws be preserved but that administration of those laws be improved through
such steps as larger state staffs with adequate budgets and more experts, prohibition of compulsory membership in rating bureaus, closer
supervision of the activities of rating bureaus and grading of municipalities for rate-making purposes.19 8 These suggestions are all
valuable but somewhat politically unrealistic because in the last
analysis they all depend on larger and more skilled insurance department staffs for which state legislatures are not likely to provide the
necessary money.

d. Individual Risk Inspection?
In England there is no public supervision of rates. The so-called
"tariff companies" do fix rates through the Fire Office Committee.
But the "non-tariff" companies, which are able to capture many of
the large individual risks because of their more ready ability to quotespecial rates, pool their statistical loss experience but do not combine.
in making rates. Instead each company makes a close examination of
each individual risk, which one of the major companies accomplishes
by employing a staff of 20,000 inspectors and maintaining 92 branchoffices. This system was examined by the New York Insurance Department in 1948 but considered inappropriate for the United States.
because too great a departure from the bureau system which had197. Belcher, Insurance Rate Regulation and Free Enterprise, 1947 A.B.A..
SFcr. PROCEZOINGS 23; Brook, All-Industry Rate Regulation v. The
Public Interest, 1951 INs. L.J. 183, 192-93; Brook, Public Interest and the Cornmissioners' All Industry Laws, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 606 (1950); Jamieson,.
Has Competition Made Present Rating Laws Obsolete? 1955 INs. L.J. 721.
198. Orfield, Improving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. Rsv. 219,.
241-44 (1948). Ithas even been suggested that competitors be permitted to have
standing to challenge rate filings by seeking administrative review of such filings.
only until such time as genuinely effective administrative regulation is provided.
Comment, 58 MICH. L. Rgv. 730, 753 (1960).
INS. LAW
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already been so long established here. 199 Pooling of statistical loss experience would, of course, be valuable. But it is highly doubtful that
American companies could maintain immense staffs of inspectors to
cover a country so much larger than England.
e. State Antitrust Laws?
Application of state antitrust laws to cooperative rate making has
apparently never been seriously considered. Such a solution standing
by itself would, however, appear to be objectionable for several
reasons.
First, coverage of insurance by state antitrust laws appears to be
far less than complete. Some states have no general antitrust laws
at all.200 Others have general antitrust laws which do not specifically
relate to insurance. 20 1 Some still have the so-called anti-compact laws
which specifically concern insurance and particularly prohibit price
fixing or rate making.20 2 Still a fourth group of states has general
antitrust laws which specifically relate to insurance.20 3
Second, even under many general state antitrust statutes apparently insurance might not be covered. The problem is illustrated by the general Massachusetts antitrust statute, which prohibits contracts, agreements or combinations which would produce
monopoly, restrain competition or enhance the price of any "article or
199. Insurance Supervision and Practices in England (Fire, Marine & Casualty)
(1948), a report prepared by Deputy Superintendents Alfred J. Boblinger and Thomas
C. Morrill for the New York Insurance Department, pp. 3-4, 20-37. The examination
'of the English practice was apparently made as part of the determination of required
state action after passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
200. There apparently were 12 such states in 1950: Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont and West Virginia. F.T.C. Press Release and Memorandum,
April 28, 1950, p. 12.
201. There apparently were 29 such states in 1950: Alabama, California, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
"Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. Ibid. In a few of these states judicial decisions or AttorneyGeneral's rulings have held these general antitrust statutes to be specifically applicable
,to insurance. E.g., Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172
P.2d 867 (1946). But in others, early decisions holding insurance combinations not
within a general antitrust statute have apparently remained effective to the present
time. See People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co., 126 Ill. App. 636 (1906),
'Comment, The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred,43 ILL. L. Rv. 205, 213 (1948).
In New York a revision in the general antitrust statute was required to include insurance. See 1947 N.Y. ATT'y GXN. ANN. ReP. 200, TRAD. RXG. RIp. (1946-1947
Trade Cas.) 1 57,549. The change was opposed by the property insurance companies.
Weekly Underwriter, Dec. 27, 1947, p. 1619.
202. Apparently 8 states still had such laws in 1950: Georgia, Iowa, Michigan,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin. F.T.C. Press Release and Memorandum, supra note 200, at 12.
203. Some 7 states had such laws as of 1950: Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas. F.T.C. Press Release and Memorandum,
-supranote 200, at 20.
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commodity in common use."2 °4 Would insurance be considered an
"article or commodity" within this type of statute? The answer, at
least in Massachusetts, is probably "Yes." Other documents evidencing intangible claims, like trading stamps, have been held within
the statute 205 although the status of theatre tickets has been left open."'
Further, that the Massachusetts court has indicated a reluctance to
create other rather conventional exemptions from its antitrust statutes20 7 is helpful. The answer, however, would appear to be negative in
many other states, at least on the basis of some earlier cases decided
under state antitrust statutes. 0
Third, under a state version of the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine, state antitrust laws might be held inapplicable to rates which had
been approved by the insurance commissioners. Most state authority
which has considered the question points in that direction. 20

9

Fur-

204. MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 93, § 2 (1958).
205. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co. v. Murphy, 220 Mass. 281, 107 N.E. 968
(1915). Producers' goods, which have been held not to be the subject of a common-law
conspiracy, Gloucester Isinglass & Glue Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92,

27 N.E. 1005 (1891), are probably distinguishable from both insurance and trading
stamps in that they are not "common necessities" from the point of view of the
consumer, to whom the statute appears to be geared.
206. Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N.E.2d 772 (1944).
207. For example, the Massachusetts court has refused to create an exemption
from its antitrust law for labor unions engaged in price-fixing. Commonwealth v.
McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950).
208. See cases cited note 93 supra. But see cases cited note 92 supra.
209. The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," or deference by courts to administrative agencies on questions falling within the regulatory jurisdiction of the latter,
has been exhaustively considered with regard to the relation of the federal antitrust
laws and federal administrative bodies. See e.g., Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954); Von Mehren, The
Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,
67 HARV. L. Rpv. 929 (1954); Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rxv. 673 (1958). Curiously, the
applicability of the doctrine as between state antitrust laws and state administrative
bodies has been rarely examined, and apparently not at all with relation to insurance
or in recent years. See, e.g., Hadley, Public Utilities and the Anti-Trust Law, 10
B.U.L. Rgv. 351 (1930); A.B.A. Sect. of Pub. Util. Law, Report of the Committee
on the Applicability to Public Utilities of Anti-Trust Laws 19 (1922); Note, 27
HARV. L. Rzv. 286 (1914). The doctrine has, however, apparently been applied,
instinctively rather than explicitly, by the state courts in the insurance field. With
regard to cooperative rate making through the bureaus in particular, the general insurance regulatory authority of the insurance commissioner has been held not to preclude application of the state antitrust law. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss.
387, 88 So. 883 (1921). However, state statutes specifically authorizing and supervising the rating bureaus have been held to supersede the application of the state
antitrust laws. State ex rel. Taylor v. American Ins. Co., 200 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. 1946); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 94 S.W.2d
769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Tex. Att'y Gen. Opinion No. V-98, Mar. 20, 1947,
TRADE REG. ReP. (1947-1948 Trade Cas.) 1 57,557. Of course, if the rating bureaus
enter agreements outside the scope of the rating statutes, i.e., agreeing to charge the
fixed rate regardless of the insurance commissioner's disapproval, then the antitrust
laws will still apply to such an agreement. State ex rel. Barker v. Assurance Co. of
America, 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640 (1913) (dictum); Tex. Att'y Gen. Opinion No.
V-98, supra. The primary jurisdiction doctrine has also been implicitly applied to other
questions of insurance operations. Morris v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 154 Kan. 152,.
115 P2d 773 (1941)
(shareholder's suit questioning validity of stock issue);
Kavanaugh v. Underwriters Life Ins. Co., '231 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(suit for removal of officers and directors).
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ther, it would seem highly inadvisable in any event to attempt to subject insurers to the burden and expense of the existing rate filing and
approval process and then also open them to the additional expense
and upsetting of operations involved in a possible later attack on those
same rates under the state antitrust laws.
Fourth, state antitrust statutes are generally regarded as not having
any extraterritorial operation and might, therefore, be unable to
reach the central operations of rating bureaus which, as indicated
earlier, are now primarily regional in character and thus may have
little genuine connection with most states.2 10 Further, state antitrust
statutes are generally regarded as penal in nature.211 Therefore, even
if jurisdiction could be established over activities of an interstate rating
bureau under the antitrust laws of a particular state, it is highly likely
that those laws could not be effectively enforced against the out-ofstate defendants, either by direct action in the other state,212
210. State antitrust laws have generally been held not to be applicable to combinations formed outside, and which do no acts in pursuance of the combination
within, the particular state, even though one member of the conspiracy may be admitted to do business in that state. Chicago Wall Paper Mills v. General Paper Co.,
147 Fed. 491 (7th Cir. 1906) (construing the Illinois antitrust statute) ; Dreyfus Bros.
v. Corn Products Co., 204 Ala. 593, 86 So. 386 (1920). However, either the formation of the illegal agreement, Over v. Byram Foundry Co., 37 Ind. App. 452, 77
N.E. 302 (1906) ; or the performance of acts in pursuance of the agreement, WatersPierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) (construing the Texas antitrust
statute), will be enough to establish jurisdiction under state antitrust laws. There is
strong suggestion from a number of the early state insurance antitrust cases that
mere "effects" within the particular state, State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 66
Ark. 466, 51 S.W. 633 (1899) ; State v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 66 Ark. 480, 51 S.W.
638 (1899); State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097 (1893); or even "effects"
wholly outside the particular state, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 76 Ark. 303,
89 S.W. 42 (1905), would be enough to establish jurisdiction. The logic of these
last cases would seem to apply to the interstate rating bureau situation. These cases,
however, may be considered as of limited authority because: (1) they really turned
on the state's power to exclude foreign corporations doing business in the state,
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909) (construing the Arkansas
statute considered in the Hartford Fire Ins. case) ; (2) they were decided during a
period of great state anxiety to control the insurance rate-making combinations at
any cost; and (3) the state statutes involved did not extend in any way to interstate or foreign commerce as does the Sherman Act, under which "effects" on
American foreign commerce apparently will be sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Cf. the cases collected and discussed at A'r'y GnN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST RgP.
70 (1955).
211. Witherell & Dobbins Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 267 Fed. 950 (1st
Cir. 1919) (construing a Massachusetts statute forbidding tie-ins and fixing a money
penalty) ; State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., supra note 210 (construing an insurance
price-fixing statute with a money penalty).
212. State courts generally will not hear direct actions brought on penal statutes
of another state. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918);
Brower v. Watson, 146 Tenn. 626, 244 S.W. 362 (1922). Of course, whether a
statute will be considered penal apparently depends on whether it affords only a
public, as distinguished from a private, remedy. Huntington v. Attrifl, 146 U.S. 657
(1892). It does not appear to have been clearly established that a private state
antitrust law action for damages would be regarded as not being penal, although
some help might be drawn from analogous cases construing other types of state laws.
Salonen v. Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky. 1949) (state anti-gambling statute
awarding triple damages to private party not penal); Adams v. Fitchburg R.R.,
67 Vt. 76, 30 Atl. 687 (1894) (double damages under state wrongful death statute
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or by suit in the other state to enforce a judgment obtained
2 18
in the first state.

Fifth, enforcement of local antitrust statutes would, of course,
vary from state to state. Also judicial decisions in different states
would establish different standards although most states would
probably follow the basic policy of condemning price-fixing agreements. For these reasons a uniform national policy might be considered desirable, if not legally mandatory.2 14 The federal antitrust
laws as applied to price fixing, no less than the federal labor laws,21 5
could be considered as reflecting a national policy of sufficient importance that contradictory state policies should not be permitted to
weaken their application.
f. Federal Antitrust Laws?
In the one federal case which has considered the All-Industry
rating laws, an action under the Sherman Act alleging an unlawful
conspiracy to fix rates through a rating bureau was denied because of
not penal). The problem would also arise where a private party sought an injunction under a state antitrust statute. Compare Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters
Ass'n, 226 Minn. 367, 33 N.W.2d 48 (1948), which held an action by a private
citizen for forfeiture of the charter of a local fire insurance underwriters association
for acts of boycott contrary to the state antitrust laws to be a civil and not a penal
action. On this general subject, see Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and

Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. Rtv. 193 (1932).
213. A judgment based upon a penal law apparently need not be given full

faith and credit by another state. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co, 127 U.S. 265 (1888).

Although Pelican was generally criticized in the later case of Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), this particular question was expressly
left open. For a recent discussion of these problems with particular relation to
insurance, see Kimble, The McCarran Act and the Constitution, 13 Ass'N ov LIFE
INS. COUNSEL PROCXDINrS 339 (1956).
214. The question of pre-emption of the field from state antitrust laws by the
federal antitrust laws seems to have been little considered. Early federal and state
cases held that state antitrust laws could not be applied to transactions involving
interstate commerce. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed.
242 (8th Cir. 1906); Eclipse Paint & Mfg. Co. v. New Process Roofing & Supply
Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 553, 120 S.W. 532 (1909). The state courts, however, found
means of avoiding any conflict by applying the state laws only to that part of
the combination or agreement which related to commerce wholly within the particular state, People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N.E. 349
(1903), or by developing a modification of the "original package" doctrine, Standard
Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705 (1907). More modern cases have
taken the position that state antitrust laws should apply unless there is a direct
conflict with the federal antitrust laws. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249,
93 N.E.2d 751 (1950). This position is quite logically justified on the ground that
the Department of Justice, as a practical matter, is simply unable to prosecute all
antitrust violations. Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 510, 511 (1951). In the insurance field
and under the McCarran-Ferguson Act in particular, at least one state court has
faced the question directly by applying a state antitrust statute to an agents' association boycott subject to section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and holding
that Congress did not intend to exclude the application of state antitrust laws to
those acts. Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867

(1946).

215. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption, but the District Court opinion
in that case made quite clear that, but for the protection afforded by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the bureau activities would have constituted illegal price fixing.2" 6 On the basis of the conclusions already
reached that the section 2(b) proviso of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
means effective regulation and that the states under the present rating
structure are not producing the most effective rates possible, the
federal antitrust laws apparently could be applied to the rating bureaus
even without any change in the present McCarran-Ferguson Act.
That the Department of Justice takes this view is shown by
several recent statements. For example, warning has been issued that
interstate rating bureaus whose rates are being used in states where
the bureaus themselves have not officially filed as advisory bodies
under the "model" laws may well be guilty of illegal price fixing under
the federal antitrust laws.117 This warning would appear to be based
on the theory that the state where the bureau has not filed for approval
of its status has not "regulated" that bureau's activities within the
proviso of section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The wisdom of any attempt on this theory to apply the federal
antitrust laws exclusively would, however, seem questionable. First,
any such application would, of course, raise the problem of federal
pre-emption mentioned above. Second, it would also raise another
version of the problem of "primary jurisdiction." This latter doctrine
apparently has been applied by federal courts in favor of state, as
distinguished from federal, administrative agencies. 1 The Supreme
Court's latest "primary jurisdiction" decision, United States v. Radio
Corp. of America, does suggest the possibility, however, that any
obstacle under this heading might be overcome. 19 It might be argued
that insurance companies are not common carriers and are not subject to an absolutely uniform tariff and that, therefore, rate agreements
216. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d
174 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950). The District Judge clearly
stated that "in the absence of public regulation or Congressional exemption, the
price-fixing activities of the Bureau involved in this case would constitute a violation
of the Sherman Act," citing Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150
(1940). See North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 85 F.
Supp. 961, 964 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
217. Hansen, Insurance Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 1957 INs. L.J.

669, 674. The author was formerly Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
218. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939); Woodrich v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 71 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1934).
219. 358 U.S. 334 (1959). The Court held that approval by the F.C.C. of an
exchange of television stations did not bar a civil antitrust action by the United
States attacking the exchange under the Sherman Act.
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approved by state insurance departments may be attacked later under the
federal antitrust laws. 20 Insurance, however, would seem to be subject to that type of state regulation which should not be open to
attack under the antitrust laws "for otherwise sporadic action by
federal courts would disrupt an agency's delicate regulatory scheme,
and would throw existing rate structures out of balance." 2 2 ' And, as

stated above in connection with the discussion of state antitrust laws,
it would seem quite inequitable to subject the insurers to the burden
and expense of two separate proceedings, one administrative and the
other under the antitrust laws.
2. For Tie-in Sales?
The analysis of tie-in transactions in insurance presented above
certainly suggests that state regulation of this problem has not been
effective, but rather quite irregular.
Here, as in the problem of rate making, several alternative solutions for better control of insurance tie-in practices are available under
existing law. Here, however, the alternative of improving the effectiveness of direct administrative supervision is not available. Rather
the task is one of finding the most realistic indirect means of reaching
a type of business dealing which restrains trade.

a. State Statutes Other Than Antitrust Laws?
As has been seen above, judicial construction ot state antiinducement and anti-discrimination statutes has been erratic. And the
cases involving credit life insurance under the state usury statutes
disclose considerable uncertainty as to the proper handling of the
tie-in problem. These difficulties could be avoided if the problem were
treated instead as a problem of restraint of trade or antitrust. In
consideration of insurance tie-ins under these latter legal rubrics,
courts would mtuch more likely come to a full appreciation of the
issues involved.
220. These are the grounds on which the Court seems to have distinguished its
previous holding in McLean 'Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944),
which did, involve a regulatory scheme involving fixed rates and which held that
the merger of a number of trucking lines approved by the I.C.C. could not be
attacked subsequently by the United States under the antitrust laws. United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, supra note 219, at 348.
221. 358 U.S. 334 at 348.
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b. Federal Antitrust Laws?
Unsatisfactory as many aspects of the treatment of tie-in problems may have been under state anti-inducement and anti-rebate
statutes, application of the federal antitrust laws in this area would
not be without its difficulties.
Clearly, in connection with insurance tie-in problems the Department of Justice does adopt the view that the section 2(b) proviso of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act means effective state regulation and that,
because state regulation of these practices has not been effective, the
federal antitrust laws are applicable. The Department of Justice recently conducted an investigation and presented a case to the grand
jury against a large Los Angeles lender who had flatly refused to accept any mutual insurance on property on which it made loans. Department officials have clearly warned that a large lender refusing to
accept all mutual insurance or a substantial number of small lenders
doing the same would be regarded as unlawful "tie-ins" constituting
federal antitrust violations. A definite procedure has apparently also
been established with other federal agencies for investigating and disposing of complaints based on insurance tie-ins. 2
But has not the Department, in adopting this position, overlooked
several serious obstacles in applying the federal antitrust laws to these
cases ?
Tie-ins, of course, are open to attack under either section 1 of the
Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act. 22 ' Taking section 3 of
the Clayton Act first, there appears to be considerable doubt, reinforced by the Supreme Court's latest tie-in decision, whether courts
would hold insurance to be a "commodity" within that section. Opponents of the inclusion of insurance within section 3 could rely not
only on Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States24 but also on the
District Court holding in United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.," 5 which held that money, being an intangible, was not a
222. Hansen, supra note 217, at 672; Hamilton, Anti-Trust Decisions, Best's Ins.
News (Fire & Cas. ed.) Jan. 1958, p. 103, at pp. 106-07.
223. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). That section applies only to
tie-in sales or leases of "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities."
224. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The action there was brought only under section 1 of
the Sherman Act against sales and leases of land holdings by a railroad with
preferential routing clauses included in many of the contracts. Presumably suit
was not brought under the easier (for the Government) alternative of section 3 of
the Clayton Act because land might not fall within the definition set forth in that
section. See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 H.Av. L. Rzv. 50, 51 (1958).
225. 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951). Investors Diversified Services, Inc., an
investment company, granted mortgage loans subject to the requirement that all
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"commodity" within section 3. They might also claim support from a
number of state antitrust cases discussed earlier in this paper which
held specifically that insurance was not a "commodity" for purposes of
those state laws.22 6 There are, however, strong arguments for the inclusion of insurance within section 3. First, there are also many state anti22 7
trust and anti-compact cases holding that insurance is a "commodity."
Second, federal courts have construed other general federal statutes to
cover insurance and the insurance business on the basis that insurance has really assumed the role of a necessity in our modern
economic life.22 Third, for federal income tax purposes, insurance, or
at least life insurance, policies are in fact regarded just as if they
were salable property or commodities of any other type.22
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act any attack on insurance tieins might run into the difficulty of establishing "dominance" by the
insurance company in the tying product, which presumably would

normally be the loan rather than the insurance. 28 ° However, this
burden may have been made easier by the recent Supreme Court
hazard insurance on the property be written, placed or sold by it. Motion to strike a
count under section 3 of the Clayton Act was granted by the District Court on the
grounds that the "money," the subject of the mortgage loan, was not "sold" or
"leased" within the meaning of section 3 and also that "money" is not a "commodity"
within that section. The only even indirect reference to the status of insurance under
section 3 appears in Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609
n.27 (1953). There the Supreme Court observed that the Government had elected
to proceed in that case, which involved newspaper advertising space contracts, only
under the Sherman Act. The Court, in the cited footnote, referred, however, to
oral argument made by the Government that advertising space was not a "commodity" within section 2 of the Clayton Act. They then cited Investors Diversified
Services by way of comparison and continued: "We express no views on that
statutory interpretation." As for Investors Diversified Services, Inc. itself, it controls over $2.7 billions of invested assets and in 1957 set up a wholly owned life
insurance subsidiary which was authorized to write insurance in 19 states and
sought licenses in 17 others. Business Week, Feb. 14, 1959, p. 108, at p. 112. This
information suggests the possibility of tie-ins of the credit life insurance variety. See
notes 187-191 supra and accompanying text.
226. Cases cited note 93 supra. For a relatively recent case so holding under the
New York antitrust law, N.Y. GiN. Bus. LAW § 340, see Danzig v. Kern, N.Y.L.J.
2032, Dec. 18, 1941 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub noma.
Danzig v. Hess, 264 App. Div. 715, 34
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1942).
227. See cases cited notes 92 and 97 supra.
228. Darr. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 871 (1948), holding insurance to be a "subject of commerce," although an intangible, within section 3(i) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1958).
229. Percy W. Phillips, 30 T.C. 866 (1958), rev'd, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.
1960). But see Arnfeld v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
230. Until recently at least, the accepted test for establishing an illegal tie-in
under section 1 of the Sherman Act had been the showing of a dominant or
monopolistic position occupied by the seller in the market for the tying product
plus the restraining of a substantial amount of commerce in the tied product. TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
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decision in Northern Pac. Ry. which appears to have reduced the
requirement of a demonstration of a substantial monopoly in the tying
product to a showing of "sufficient economic power to appreciably
'23
restrain competition in the market for the tied product." '
Unfortunately no judicial decisions have yet dealt directly with
these problems. But this has not deterred the Government. Investors
Diversified Services finally resulted in a consent decree in favor of the
United States enjoining the tie-ins under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 232 And in another federal court a consent decree was
entered under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the
Clayton Act restraining life insurance companies from maintaining
funeral service subsidiaries, entering contracts with funeral directors
which prevented the latter from serving any persons other than the
insurance companies, restricting the number of funeral homes the
directors could own and restricting the funeral directors from buying
their funeral merchandise from any persons other than the life insur233
ance companies.
Application of the federal antitrust laws to insurance tie-ins
would, of course, not raise the problem of primary jurisdiction because the states have not handled this particular problem through the
administrative agency device. The federal pre-emption problem, however, would be raised again. As will be suggested below, the desirability of a uniform federal antitrust policy with regard to tie-ins as
well as price fixing may be outweighed by the strong possibility, as
outlined above, that courts would find the federal antitrust laws inapplicable to insurance tie-ins.
c. State Antitrust Laws?
For this reason we must devote serious consideration to the
resolution of the tie-in problem through the application of state antitrust statutes. First, we would, of course, still be faced with the
problem of spotty state antitrust coverage of insurance. But, second,
for the same reason as suggested above in connection with the application of the federal antitrust laws, the problem of primary jurisdiction would be eliminated. Third, there should be no problem of
extraterritorial application of the state laws because loan and insurance
231. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
232. United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Civil No. 3713, D.
Minn., June 30, 1954, TRADE R8G. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67,799 (consent decree).
233. United States v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., Civil No. 7719-S, N.D. Ala.,
June 29, 1954, TRADP R9G. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) 1 67,801 (consent decree).
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combination transactions would necessarily require some sort of
local business contact or acts by the selling company through brokers
or agents which would establish sufficient basis for jurisdiction by the
2 4
state of residence of the insured borrower. 8
D. What Solution Would Be Ideal?
From the discussion above it is obvious that any attempt under
present law to resolve the problem of application of suitable controls
to rate making and tie-ins in insurance will raise many difficult and
distracting issues. In order to avoid these complexities as far as
possible, other possible courses the law might take which would seem
to be both effective and at the same time politically feasible will be
examined.

1. For Rate Making?
The most satisfactory solution to the rate-making problem would
seem to be to have the states revi~e the present All-Industry model
law structure, which is basically founded on the bureau system and
necessarily overemphasizes the role of their member property insurance companies. Better and more competitive rates would seem to
require adoption of the California-type law. This would eliminate
advance filings and yet still protect the public by allowing the insurance
commissioner to challenge rates at any time. He should be able to
administer this type of law much more satisfactorily with perhaps an
even smaller staff. The individual companies would then be completely
free to fix their own rates separately. If, as the bureau companies
themselves maintain, independent rate setting will result in predatory
price cutting and risk of company insolvencies, this problem can be met
by devoting the state insurance department resources, previously dissipated in the impossible attempt to review a myriad of rate filings,
to better and more careful examinations and audits of companies.
This approach to the problem has been followed in England with success
and apparently with much smaller proportionate requirements for
staff and budget. 5'
234. Cf. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 399 U.S. 643 (1950).
235. See Kadyk, Control and Regulation of British Insurance Companies, 1950
A.B.A. SXCT. oP INs. LAw PROCUeDINGS:63. Apparently 10 employees of the Board

of Trade (not counting actuarial assistants) in 1949 supervised the solvency requirements of all English insurance companies, whose total 1948 premiums were
some $1,700,000,000. New York required some 335 employees to supervise companies
writing approximately the same volume of insurance premiums. Illinois required
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Requiring each company actually to set its own rates would
naturally demand executive ingenuity and imagination not called for
under the present rate-making system. Insurance has traditionally attracted more conservative career types. 23 6 If a more daring and fertile
sort of mind is required for independent rate making, it will doubtless
be necessary to provide in insurance the same kind of monetary and
23 7
fringe benefit incentives now available in industry generally.
If property insurance companies are to set rates individually, then
as in the life insurance business a broad loss experience should be
made available to them. This would require that a complete revision
of the present class and schedule rating system be undertaken so that
a national loss experience can be obtained. That loss experience should
then be mandatorilypooled in a central industry organization and made
available to the various insurance companies. 238 Fire and casualty
insurance trade associations engaged in such statistics-collecting activity
would seem to be lawful under both federal and state antitrust laws
and would serve the useful economic function of correcting the inherent
defect preventing true competition in insurance rate making, i.e.,
150 employees for half that premium volume. Id. at 80. A former New York
Superintendent of Insurance has concurred in this general approach: "If we had to
eliminate all phases of insurance supervision except one, the examination of companies would be retained. It is the most important thing we do. The solvency of
companies, their honesty and intelligent management, and ability and willingness
to meet their obligations as they occur, is of primary importance to the public."
Pink, State of New York, Eighty-First Ann. Rep. of the Superintendent of Insurance,
pt. 1, p. 37a (1940). See also Smith, supra note 134, at 83-84. For a dim view of the
effectiveness of state insurance examinations, see 91 CONG. REc. A 4168 (1945)
(statement by Senator O'Mahoney).
236. "Indeed, the soaring imagination is suspect in insurance. . . . It was considered a mark of statesmanship for an executive to keep his company in line with
the 'right practices' in the way of policy forms, rates, and commissions, and an
honor to be an officer in one of the cooperative organizations that enforced
stabilization among the companies." Fortune Magazine, The Underwriters, July 1950,
p. 77, at p. 108.
237. Surprisingly enough, insurance companies only infrequently have any
plans of the following types for their executives and key employees: stock options,
deferred compensation plans, executive bonus plans, profit-sharing plans, and thrift
or savings plans. Such plans are either forbidden or severely limited by statutes in
most states as a result of the Armstrong Investigation of 1905. That investigation
uncovered many abuses by life insurance companies by way of excessive salaries
and expenses. For a summary of the findings and recommendations of the investigating
committee, see Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly to
Investigate the Affairs of Life Insurance Companies, N.Y. Ass'y Doc. No. 41,
pp. 357-442 (1906). A good short summary of this investigation, which made
Charles Evans Hughes famous as its counsel, appears in Anderson, The Armstrong
Investigating in Retrospect, 11 AsS'N op LiFE INS. COUNSEL PRECEEDINGS 237 (1952).
For present state law limitations, see Cavanaugh, Restrictions affecting Insurance
Company Pay Plans, 1958 AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION (Legal Sect.) PROCEEDINGS

195.
238. An optional experience pooling has been suggested, but this would seem
to be self-defeating. See 2 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 380 (1958).

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
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absence of full knowledge of the market facts on which truly intelligent
competitive judgments must be based."' 9
In order to insure, however, that companies would not attempt to
cooperate in the actual setting of rates based on the collective loss
information, they would be fully subject to the antitrust laws. Despite
the interstate nature of company operations and the natural desire
to insure uniform national enforcement, the federal antitrust laws
and the state antitrust laws should apply concurrently.24 ° This solution would not require any change in the present McCarran-Ferguson
Act because it could readily be argued that, if the states failed to
enforce their antitrust statutes against rate-making or price-fixing
combinations, then the federal antitrust laws should apply on the
239. Such an arrangement would appear to be valid under federal law under such
authorities as United States v. Watch Case Mfrs. Bd. of Trade, Inc., Civil No.
67-296, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 19, 1953, TRADE REG. REP. (1952-1953 Trade Cas.)
67,422
(consent decree). If such precautions as not identifying source and making information generally available were taken, then trade association activity would appear to fall
outside the prohibition of such cases as American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) and Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936). In fact, in a case upholding one of the early state anti-compact statutes, Mr.
Justice Holmes clearly stated: "The bill seems to assume that the statute forbids insurance companies to obtain and use each other's experience, or to employ the same person
to work up the results. It does not. It simply forbids an agreement between the
companies relating to the rates which may be based upon those results." Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411-12 (1905). Such an arrangement would apparently also be valid under a state law like that of Massachusetts. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 2 (1958), forbidding combinations in restraint of trade, has
been held not to apply to a bureau formed to do engineering estimates for bids by
sprinkler manufacturers in order to reduce costs and to overcome the shortage of
engineers. The bureau apparently did not engage in any consideration of bid prices
and did not pass bid information around among the various bureau members.
Berenson v. H. G. Vogel Co., 253 Mass. 185, 148 N.E. 450 (1925), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 577 (1925). Analogous arrangements do exist in the life insurance industry
*and would seem, at least to the extent now maintained, to be unobjectionable under
the antitrust laws. For example, the life insurance companies maintain a Medical
Information Bureau which gathers centrally the medical impairment data received
by various member companies concerning applicants for life insurance. The Bureau's
facilities are used to check statements concerning medical history made by applicants
for life insurance in any member company for possible misrepresentations. The
workings of the Bureau are described in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Strudel, 243 F.2d
90, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1957) and in Gallagher v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
33 N.J. Super. 128, 109 A.2d 457 (1954), aff'd, 19 N.J. 14, 114 A.2d 857 (1955). Apparently no cases have construed this Bureau's status under the federal antitrust
laws. But it has been held valid under the New York state antitrust law. 1954
N.Y. ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 189. And the arrangement would seem to fall under
the principle of those federal antitrust cases which justify cooperative activities
seeking to defend sellers against the fraud of buyers, fraud being a factor which
naturally would upset the otherwise normal operation of the competitive market
mechanism. E.g., Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588,
603-04 (1925). For an example of an unlawful insurance industry "trade association" - type practice, see United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York,
Civil No. 37-247, S.D.N.Y., June 28, 1948, TRADE REG. REP. (1948-1949 Trade Cas.)
ff 62,273. In general, see the discussion of permissible trade association activities in
LAMB & KITTELLE, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 31-52 (1956).

240.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 93, § 2 (1958)

clearly prohibits price-fixing

agreements. And this prohibition is apparently strictly construed. Commonwealth v.
McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass.
472, 138 N.E. 296 (1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 751 (1923).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/1

66

SPRING

1961]

Wiley:
Pups, PlantsANTITRUST
and Package Policies
- Or the Insurance Antitrust Ex
EXEMPTION
INSURANCE

ground that the states had not regulated effectively within the meaning
of the section 2(b) proviso of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. State
enforcement efforts would also fill gaps created by limitations in
federal budgets and staffs.
2. For Tie-in Sales?
Because the apparent pattern of judicial decisions under the
federal antitrust laws points towards the exclusion of insurance tie-in

practices from their application, the most practical solution to regulation of these restraints of trade would be to subject them to the
operation of a state statute expressly forbidding the particular transaction.
Present state anti-inducement and anti-discrimination statutes
would not do the job satisfactorily because many of them were obviously not drafted with the tie-in situation in mind. And, as we
have seen, many of them have also been interpreted too narrowly. The
insurance industry, in cooperation with the NAIC, should prepare a
uniform statute for adoption in the several states. Such a course of
action has been successfully followed in an attempt to meet other insurance trade regulation problems.2 4 ' The uniform statute could be
patterned generally after section 3 of the Clayton Act. It should grant
rights to sue to both the state government, either through the attorney
general or the insurance commissioner, and to any aggrieved private
party. Specified remedies should include, of course, injunctions, substantial fines and actual, and perhaps even penalty, damages.
Again, this solution would require no change in the present
McCarran-Ferguson Act but instead would seem to be carrying out
its basic intent; and it would seem much more realistic politically than
any attempt to have Congress amend the present federal antitrust laws
so that they would clearly cover insurance tie-ins.

V.

SUMMARY.

Quite clearly the proposals just made are nothing more than
specific suggestions for improving the effectiveness of state regulation of insurance, not in broad sweeping terms, but only with reference to two particular insurance industry practices, rate making and
tie-ins, which may be regarded as restraints of trade. These narrow
241. For example, the NAIC in cooperation with the industry prepared an

Unfair Trade Practices Act, 1947 NAIC

PROCE-DINGS

392, which by 1958 had been

adopted in some 42 states and 3 territories, 2 1958 NAIC

PROCEEDINGS

328.
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recommendations reflect the basic thesis of this paper as to the intention of Congress with regard to antitrust problems in passing the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
As discussed earlier, Congress faced three distinct problems as
a result of the holdings in the South-Eastern Underwriters case: first,
preservation of general state insurance regulation which did not involve problems of restrictions on competition; second, preservation of
state taxation of insurance; and third, applicability of the federal
antitrust laws. In sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act Congress stated flatly that the first two of these subjects were to
remain within the control of the states without qualification.
The third subject was dealt with specifically in the proviso to
section 2(b). Unfortunately the urgency surrounding the passage
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act prevented Congress from making a
careful and detailed examination of every separate insurance industry
practice which might conceivably constitute a restraint of trade and
from determining the extent to which it wanted the federal antitrust
laws to be applicable to each such practice. The South-Eastern Underwriters decision itself directed Congress' attention only to the two
specific problems of rate making and acts of boycott, coercion and
intimidation. As indicated earlier, Congress adopted two completely
different solutions for these two specific practices which it did consider in detail. Boycotts were made expressly and permanently subject
to the federal antitrust laws by the provisions of section 3(b). Rate
making was, by the proviso of section 2(b), exempted conditionally
from the federal antitrust laws, the condition being that the states
perform substantially the same functions as would be performed by
application of the federal antitrust laws - providing the public with
the best possible insurance protection at the lowest possible cost.
Because of lack of time other insurance practices which might constitute restraints of trade were not dealt with individually but were
simply swept under the philosophy applied to the rate-making problem. Thus, by virtue of this section 2(b) proviso, with the exception of
acts of boycott, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, which deal with a
wide variety of restraints of trade, were to apply to those restraints in
the insurance business only to the extent that the undesirable features
of those restraints had not been "regulated" by the states.
The legislative history analyzed above makes quite clear that
Congress did not intend to subvert the achievement of South-Eastern
Underwriters by permitting mere "paper" state regulation to exclude
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operation of the federal antitrust laws. What the Congress intended
was that the states should undertake, restrictive practice by restrictive
practice, to provide suitable machinery for control. There is much
contemporary evidence that this is precisely what both the states and
the insurance industry understood the congressional mandate to be.
All parties concerned appear to have understood that so long as the
states provided effective control of restrictive insurance practices the
federal antitrust statutes would not apply. If, however, the states
failed to assume their responsibility, then the federal authorities were
to be free to step back in - even without any change in the present
language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The ability of federal
authorities to apply the federal antitrust laws would naturally be conditioned on a determination that as to the single particularrestrictive
practice involved the states had failed to do an effective job of regulating that particularpractice.
In light of this background it is almost impossible to comprehend the position taken by the Supreme Court in the National
Casualty and American Hospital & Life cases. First, the Court's
suggestion that mere "paper" state regulation would be enough to
prevent application of the federal laws controlling competition seems
to run directly contrary to Congress' intent. And, second, to note
blandly that the majority of states have enacted their own unfair
trade practice laws completely ignores the obvious intention of Congress
that the actual effectiveness of operation of those laws should be
examined with regard to the particular alleged restrictive practice.
The Court's failure to analyze adequately the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act with regard to the application of the federal
antitrust laws to the business of insurance stems, it appears, from its
failure to appreciate the three separate objectives, outlined above, which
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was seeking to accomplish. State regulation of insurance is not one, but three, regulations. The McCarranFerguson Act cannot be viewed as laying down one blanket policy for
all questions of insurance regulation. The antitrust question must be
cut out and analyzed separately.
That the Court's conclusions in the National Casualty and American Hospital& Life per curiam opinion rest on this dubious assumption,
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is to be viewed as a whole, is made
apparent by the Court's subsequent insurance decision in SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America.240 There the Court held,
five to four, that variable annuities are subject to regulation by the
242. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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SEC. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, avoided the
McCarran-Ferguson Act problem by finding that variable annuities
are not insurance. The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan,
writing for himself and Mr. Justice Stewart, did not reach the question
of the application of the Act. But Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Justices Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker,
reveals the source of the misunderstanding in the National Casualty
and American Hospital & Life cases. Mr. Justice Harlan stated that
in those decisions - "we declined to give a niggardly construction to
the McCarran Act."24 He also later stated that Congress, in response
to South-Eastern Underwriters "enacted the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, . . . which on its face demonstrates the purpose 'broadly to give
support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and
taxing the business of insurance,' Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
supra, at 429, and 'to assure that existing state power to regulate insurance would continue.' Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co.,: supra, at 319."2" The first of the decisions cited by Mr. Justice
Harlan, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,2 4 upheld state taxation of
insurance companies, and the second, Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co.,246 upheld a state statute controlling policy terms, both
-in the light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. They accurately reflect congressional policy as to the first of the two purposes of that Act. But
they have nothing to do with Congress' intention with regard to the
third purpose of that Act - to express the conditional inapplicability
of the federal antitrust laws.
In its current investigation the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee has clearly indicated that it proposes to review the entire status of regulation of restrictive insurance practices by the states
and to attempt to determine whether any revision should be made by
Congress of the partial and conditional exemption from the federal
antitrust laws now afforded insurance by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. That investigation is taking up each potential restrictive practice
It seems rather unfortunate that the efforts of the
separately. 4
subcommittee are being viewed by at least some of the state insurance
authorities as primarily the first step in the direction of affirmative
federal regulation of the insurance business.24
243. Id. at 96-97.
244. Id. at 99.
245. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
246. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
247. See note 14 supra.
248. Address of Joseph A. Navarre, Insurance Commissioner of Michigan, reported in Eastern Underwriter, Oct. 10, 1958, p. 26, col. 3; Navarre, Federal Investigation of Insurance, 1958 INs. L.J. 653. See also statement of Gov. Robert B. Meyner
of New Jersey, in N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1958, p. 60, col. 2 (city ed.).
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Such attitudes reflect an oversimplification of the problem. The
courts, on the one hand, are tending to overgeneralize in favor of any
form of state regulation of insurance without any discrimination as
to the real congressional intent. The state insurance commissioners
and the insurance industry, on the other hand, are overgeneralizing
against any form of federal intervention or control, again without
discrimination.
Generalizations of this nature are dangerous.
Instead, from the courts, including the Supreme Court, is required a realistic interpretation of the present McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The interpretation currently being given to that Act on insurance
antitrust-type problems only tends to obscure the necessity for action
by the states to improve their regulation of insurance and perhaps, by
creating a false impression to the contrary, is even hastening the
likelihood of action by an impatient Congress which will look toward
direct federal regulation of the insurance industry.
What is required on the part of state insurance commissioners and
the insurance industry itself is a full understanding of the nature of the
limited antitrust exemption granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
a careful examination of the effectiveness of state control of individual
insurance practices constituting actual or potential antitrust violations and a serious effort to make those revisions in state law which
will foreclose the necessity either of applying the federal antitrust
laws under the present McCarran-Ferguson Act or of revising that
Act.

24 9

249. Such careful surveys were made in the years immediately following passage
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, for example, the thorough 43 page analysis
of insurance practices and the federal antitrust laws prepared for the fire insurance
industry. First, Second and Third Reports of the Sub-Committee of Lawyers to the
Committee on Laws of the National Board of Fire Underwriters (1945). New
York, always the dominant state in insurance regulation, made an extremely comprehensive study of the same nature. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation, Leg. Doc. No. 46 (1948). This special joint committee has been continued and regularly prepares studies and reports on problems
of insurance regulation. See also 4 N.Y. EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIS
1-66 (Straub ed. 1954) for a thorough analysis of New York regulation and the
antitrust law prepared by the New York department itself. What is undoubtedly the
most comprehensive examination of state regulation in light of the antitrust laws

is a six volume survey of the laws of every state prepared by the Federal Trade

Commission in 1950. Only four typed copies of this survey were made. However,
its results are summarized in F.T.C. Press Release, April 28, 1950, accompanied
by a 27 page Memorandum by Mr. E. W. Thomerson, Ass't Gen. Counsel of the
F.T.C. What is now required are more careful studies of this same general type.
It should be noted that the Attorney-General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws completely ignored the problem of insurance although Chap. VI of the
Report was devoted to various other exemptions. The omission of insurance has
been criticized both by some Committee members, ATT'Y GtN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST
REP. 290-91 (1955), and by others, 1955 A.B.A. ANTITRUST LAW SECT. PROCEEDINGS
131. A relatively recent compilation of the various state statutes dealing with
specific restrictive practices appears in Donovan, The Case in Favor of Existing
Exemptions from the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 56 (1960).
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This paper has attempted to make clear the true intention of
Congress with regard to antitrust and the business of insurance as
expressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and to suggest the way to
adequate control of but two specific insurance practices by the state rate making and tie-ins. Similar detailed and individualized studies are
essential for a myriad of other insurance practices actually, or potentially, in restraint of trade.
If this paper has, at least, provided a clearer understanding of the
task before the courts, the states and the business of insurance, it will
have accomplished its purpose.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/1

72

